Mayson & Wellard

In this case, the appellant sought leave to appeal against the decision of the primary judge in property settlement proceedings between her and the respondent, who was her former de facto partner. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for various offences against the appellant, including rape and sexual assaults, which occurred during and after the de facto relationship. The primary judge found that the de facto relationship existed from mid-2009 until 8 November 2015, and ordered an equal division of the parties' property. The appellant argued that the relationship only existed from February 2010 until late 2011 or early 2012, and that the primary judge erred in finding that there was a genuine domestic relationship and a relevant sexual relationship after that time. The appellant also sought leave to adduce further evidence, including the details of the respondent's convictions and sentences, to support her case.

The legal issues in this appeal were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the de facto relationship existed for longer than the appellant contended, and whether the appellant should be granted leave to adduce further evidence to support her case. The court found that the primary judge had erred in finding that the de facto relationship existed for longer than the appellant contended, and that there was a genuine domestic relationship and a relevant sexual relationship after late 2011 or early 2012. The court also found that the appellant should be granted leave to adduce further evidence, including the details of the respondent's convictions and sentences, to support her case.

The court held that the primary judge erred in finding that the de facto relationship existed for longer than the appellant contended, and that there was a genuine domestic relationship and a relevant sexual relationship after late 2011 or early 2012. The court found that the primary judge had failed to properly consider the evidence of the appellant's experience of domestic violence and sexual assaults at the hands of the respondent, and that this evidence was relevant to the existence and nature of the de facto relationship. The court also found that the primary judge had erred in finding that the respondent's breaches of domestic violence orders subsequent to the cessation of the de facto relationship were irrelevant to the existence and nature of the relationship.

The court granted the appellant leave to adduce further evidence, including the details of the respondent's convictions and sentences, to support her case. The court found that this evidence was relevant to the appellant's case at trial, and that it demonstrated error by the primary judge. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the primary judge, and remitted the proceedings to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for re-hearing by a Judge other than the primary judge. The court also granted the appellant a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), being a certificate that in the opinion of the Court it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by the appellant in relation to the appeal and the re-hearing.