Mak v R

The appellant, Mak, was convicted and sentenced by the County Court of Victoria to a term of imprisonment for recklessly causing serious injury. Mak appealed against his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. Mak had pleaded guilty to one count of recklessly causing serious injury by striking the victim with his fist on the right cheek. The attack was unprovoked and the extent of the injury remained unclear. The trial judge sentenced Mak to three years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and nine months. Mak was already serving a sentence for a series of other offences and had been on bail for further offences at the time of the offence for which he was sentenced. Mak argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the principle of totality should have been applied to reduce his overall term of imprisonment.

The court considered whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, and if the principle of totality should have been applied. The court noted that the appellant had been sentenced while already undergoing a sentence for other offences. The court concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the principle of totality was not applicable. The court also considered whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The court concluded that the non-parole period was not manifestly excessive. The court noted that the sentencing judge had imposed a non-parole period which was concurrent with the earlier non-parole period. However, the court held that the sentencing judge had breached s 14(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 by failing to fix a new single non-parole period in respect of all the sentences the appellant was to serve. The court re-sentenced Mak to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.

The court dismissed Mak’s appeal against sentence. The court held that the appeal decision did not raise a point of general principle. The court did not consider it appropriate to order a reduction in the non-parole period. The court held that the original sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the principle of totality was not applicable. The court held that the appellant’s overall term of imprisonment was just over four years, with a non-parole period of, in effect, three years, three months and ten days. The court concluded that the appellant’s sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the appeal decision did not raise a point of general principle.