Mahohoma v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

The applicant, Tsvakai Mahohoma, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed the refusal of her Temporary Graduate (Post-Study Work) (subclass 485) visa. The applicant had applied for the visa on 4 August 2017, and the delegate refused it on the basis that she did not satisfy clause 485.231 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). This clause requires that the applicant's study for the relevant qualification satisfied the Australian study requirement in the six months ending immediately before the day the application was made. The applicant provided evidence that she completed her course on 4 August 2017, the same day she lodged her application, which the Tribunal found did not meet the requirement.

The central legal issue before the Federal Circuit Court was the interpretation of the phrase "in the period of 6 months ending immediately before the day the application was made" within clause 485.231(3) of the Migration Regulations. Specifically, the court had to determine whether this period included the day on which the visa application was lodged. The applicant argued that a literal interpretation led to an absurd outcome, as she was only one day too late in lodging her application, and that the purpose of the visa and the legislation supported a broader interpretation that included the day of application.

Judge Kendall reasoned that the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in clause 485.231(3), when interpreted in accordance with section 36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), did not support the applicant's contention that the period included the day of application. The court found that the applicant's concession that a literal interpretation rendered her ineligible was significant. While acknowledging the applicant's argument regarding absurdity and the purpose of the visa, the court held that the language used in the regulation was clear and unambiguous. The Minister's submissions highlighted that accepting the applicant's interpretation would render the words "immediately before" superfluous and that Parliament had used consistent wording in other provisions to indicate when a period was intended to include the day of application.

The application was dismissed. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the relevant provision, and there was no jurisdictional error. The applicant's argument that the completion date of 4 August 2017, being the same day as the application, was too diligent and resulted in an absurd outcome was not sufficient to displace the plain meaning of the regulation.