MAGAR & RASTOGI

The parties in this matter were the mother and the father, who disputed parenting orders concerning their child. The child resided in Australia with the father, while the mother lived in Germany. Consent orders had previously been made granting the father sole parental responsibility and stipulating that the child live with him. The mother alleged these orders were made under coercion or duress, while the father contended there had been no significant change in circumstances and sought to rely on the principles established in *Rice & Asplund*. The proceedings were heard by Berman J in the Family Court of Australia.

The court was required to determine whether the mother had established grounds to set aside the existing consent orders, specifically whether they were made under coercion, duress, or due to a significant mental incapacity. Additionally, the court had to consider the father's application to dismiss the mother's proceedings based on the absence of a significant change in circumstances, as per *Rice & Asplund*. The court also had to address objections raised by the father regarding the admissibility and construction of the mother's trial affidavit, considering the provisions of section 135 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth) and rule 15.13 of the *Family Law Rules 2004* (Cth).

Berman J found no evidence to support the mother's claims of coercion, duress, or a debilitating mental incapacity at the time the consent orders were made. The court considered the potential adverse effects of ongoing and protracted litigation on the child and concluded that it was not in the child's best interests to reopen the proceedings. The father's application to dismiss the mother's proceedings was therefore upheld.

Consequently, the Amended Initiating Application of the mother filed on 14 July 2015 was dismissed.