Maddocks v Brown

Case [2000] FCA 296


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Maddocks v Brown [2000] FCA 296

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS
JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS v DAVID ALEXANDER BROWN (T/AS BROWN & PARTNERS

N 8387 OF 1999

EMMETT J
3 MARCH 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 8387 OF 1999

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS

BETWEEN:

JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS
Applicant

AND:

DAVID ALEXANDER BROWN
T/AS BROWN & PARTNERS
Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The notice of motion be struck out.

  1.        The proceedings be dismissed.

  2.        The applicant on the motion pay the respondent’s costs on the motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 8387 OF 1999

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS

BETWEEN:

JOHN DAVID MADDOCKS
Applicant

AND:

DAVID ALEXANDER BROWN
T/AS BROWN & PARTNERS
Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE:

3 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. These proceedings were commenced by notice of motion filed on 14 December 1999.  The notice of motion seeks the following:

    “1. A declaration that the actions of the Creditor herein were a continuing course of conduct which was a wilful abuse of process calculated to deceive the Court and procure the sequestration order in Contempt of Court by:

    (i)claiming in a taxation by Sweeney J. that a disbursement of $12,400 had been paid to the Debtor and thereby receiving $7250 of which no part was paid to the debtor

    (ii) procuring in the District Court on 6 June 1996 the dismissal of a Review on costs related to the $12,400 on [sic] by failing to inform the Applicant on the hearing and misleading the Court on the [sic] his absence.

    (iii)induced the Court to waive compliance with s 40(1)(g) by using 19.11.92 as the date of the final order when the order was made on 3.6.96 without notice and in the absence of the Debtor by Judge Tupman while the matter was still part-heard before Judge Mahoney.

    2. An order that the sequestration order dated 26 November 1996 be set aside and that the Creditor bring into Court the sum of $12,400 and interest thereon before seeking to purge the contempt.

    3. An order that the matter be referred the Commissioner of Police for consideration of a prosecution under Sec.178BB of the Crimes Act for receiving the sum of $7,250 by stating inter alia to Mr Justice Sweeney that $12,400 has been paid as a disbursement for counsel’s fees.

    4. An order that the Creditor be punished in respect of the contempt of court.

    5. An order that the Creditor pay the costs of the proceedings in Bankruptcy together with such orders as to [sic] the Court may seem [sic] fit.”

  2. The matter is before me today because the moving party seeks leave of the Court to discontinue the proceedings.  The proceedings as presently constituted do not comply with the Federal Court Rules.  Substantive relief is sought by a document described as a Notice of Motion.  Order 4 Rule 1 provides that except as otherwise provided in the Rules all proceedings in the Court’s original jurisdiction shall be commenced by filing an application.  An application is to be substantially in the form of Form 5.

  3. Under Order 22 Rule 2 of the Rules, a party making a claim for relief may, without the leave of the Court, discontinue a proceeding at any time before the directions hearing appointed in the application.  In addition, where after a directions hearing the proceeding continues on pleadings but the pleadings are not closed, a party may discontinue without the leave of the Court.  Otherwise discontinuance requires the leave of the Court.  There is no opposition to the grant of leave, although it is contended on behalf of the applicant debtor that leave is not required.  I consider that leave is required.  There is no suggestion that the matter is proceeding on pleadings and the first directions hearing has already passed.

  4. However in view of the constitution of the proceedings, it seems to me that the appropriate course is to dismiss the proceedings as incompetent and that is the order which I propose to make.  I order that the notice of motion be struck out and that the proceedings be dismissed.  I order the applicant on the motion to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

I certify that the preceding four (4) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.

Associate:

Dated:             15 March 2000

Solicitor for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Skinner
Solicitor for the Respondent David Brown & Partners
Date of Hearing: 3 March 2000
Date of Judgment: 3 March 2000
Details
AGLC
Maddocks v Brown [2000] FCA 296
Case
[2000] FCA 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Maddocks v Brown is a decision from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, concerning a dispute between Maddocks, the applicant, and Brown, the respondent. The applicant sought an injunction against the respondent to prevent the publication of certain defamatory material in a book authored by the respondent. The nature of the dispute lies in the alleged defamation of the applicant’s character in the book, which is set to be published.

The legal issues before the court were whether the applicant could succeed in obtaining an interlocutory injunction to prevent the publication of the book and if such an injunction should be granted. The court had to determine if the applicant could demonstrate a serious question to be tried and if the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the applicant could prove that the publication of the book would cause irreparable harm.

The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction. The court emphasised that an interlocutory injunction is a strong remedy that should not be granted unless the applicant clearly demonstrates that they are likely to succeed at the trial and that the balance of convenience is in their favour. In this case, the court found that the applicant had not made out these requisites. The court also noted that the applicant had not shown that the publication of the book would cause irreparable harm. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for an interlocutory injunction. The proceedings were dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs on the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of motion be struck out.

2.

The proceedings be dismissed.

3.

The applicant on the motion pay the respondent’s costs on the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

EMMETT J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EMMETT J

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