Mackenzie and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

This matter concerned an application by Ms Mackenzie for an extension of time to lodge an application for a second review of a decision made by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) on 19 November 2015. The original decision affirmed a departmental decision that Ms Mackenzie was not qualified for Disability Support Pension. The AAT had previously affirmed this decision on 19 November 2015, and Ms Mackenzie was deemed to have received this decision by 3 December 2015, with the appeal period expiring on 31 December 2015. Ms Mackenzie's application for a second review, along with an initial extension of time application, was received by the AAT on 15 February 2016, 46 days out of time. After withdrawing and then seeking to reinstate her initial extension application, she lodged a further request for an extension of time on 22 June 2016. The Tribunal was required to determine whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances to grant this extension of time.

The legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances to grant Ms Mackenzie an extension of time to lodge her application for a second review of the AAT's decision. This required the Tribunal to exercise its broad discretionary power under section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. In considering this application, the Tribunal was guided by established principles, including the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained unless proper to do so, consideration of the applicant's actions and whether they "rested on their rights," potential prejudice to the respondent, wider public prejudice, and the merits of the substantive application. The Tribunal also noted that while an acceptable explanation for delay is not essential, it is a relevant consideration.

The Tribunal considered several factors in determining reasonableness, including the length of the delay, Ms Mackenzie's awareness of her appeal rights and the explanation provided for the delay, and the prospects of success of her substantive application. The Tribunal found that the length of the delay was significant and that Ms Mackenzie's explanation for this delay was not compelling or satisfactory. Furthermore, the Tribunal considered that the prospects of success of her substantive application were limited. Weighing these factors, the Tribunal concluded that it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to grant the extension of time.

Consequently, the Tribunal refused Ms Mackenzie's application for an extension of time to lodge her application for a second review of the decision dated 19 November 2015.