Lydon v Ryding

In the case of Lydon v Ryding, the plaintiff sought an extension of a caveat over a parcel of land. The plaintiff and his mother had originally owned the property as tenants in common, but the plaintiff had transferred his one-fifth share to his mother. The plaintiff now sought an extension of the caveat to protect an alleged interest in the property. The court was required to decide whether the plaintiff had a caveatable interest in the property, and if so, whether the balance of convenience favoured the extension of the caveat.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim of a caveatable interest in the property was based on four grounds. The first was an alleged agreement between the plaintiff and his mother that in consideration of the plaintiff transferring his one-fifth share in the property, his mother promised that he would receive a one-third interest in the property when she died. The second was that the plaintiff had an alleged interest as an unpaid vendor of his one-fifth interest in the property. The third was that he had a right of access or entry to his workshop which could be protected by caveat. The fourth was a constructive trust. The court found that the first ground was not supported by evidence of part performance, and therefore the agreement was not enforceable. The second ground was a restatement of the first ground. The third ground was not supported by evidence of any arrangement or agreement concerning access to the property by the plaintiff. The court found that the fourth ground, the constructive trust, was arguable on the basis of undue influence, unconscionable conduct, and estoppel.

The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated an arguable case as to the existence of a caveatable interest in the property based on the constructive trust ground. The court noted that it was unusual to refuse an order extending a caveat where an arguable case as to the existence of a caveatable interest had been demonstrated, because the lapse or removal of the caveat had the potential to result in the destruction, for all practicable purposes, of the benefit of the proprietary interest purportedly protected by the caveat. The court therefore granted the plaintiff's application for an extension of the caveat.

The court ordered that the caveat be extended for a period of six months, and that the plaintiff bear the costs of the application.