Lucire v Parmegiani

In *Lucire v Parmegiani*, the plaintiff, Dr Lucire, sued the defendant, Mr Parmegiani, for defamation. The alleged defamation arose from a letter of complaint sent by Mr Parmegiani to the Medical Board of New South Wales concerning Dr Lucire's professional conduct. The central question before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was whether this letter of complaint was protected by absolute privilege, thereby precluding Dr Lucire's defamation claim.

The Court was required to determine whether the occasion of the complaint to the Medical Board was one of common law or statutory absolute privilege. Specifically, the Court considered whether the publication of the letter, by way of making a complaint, was a publication for the purpose of the assessment or referral of that complaint. Furthermore, the Court examined whether the letter originated absolutely privileged proceedings of the Medical Tribunal.

The Court held that the occasion of making a complaint to the Medical Board was not one of absolute privilege at common law. While acknowledging the importance of allowing complaints to be made freely, the Court found that the common law protection of absolute privilege did not extend to the initial stage of lodging a complaint with the Board. The Court also considered the relevant statutory provisions, but ultimately concluded that they did not confer absolute privilege on the communication in question. The reasoning focused on the nature of the communication as an initial complaint rather than a part of formal tribunal proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court of Appeal upholding the primary judge's decision that the letter of complaint was not protected by absolute privilege.