Loveridge & Emery & Anor

In the Family Court of Australia, Austin J considered an application by the father for his own disqualification due to apprehended bias, stemming from the judicial officer's prior brief pro bono representation of the mother in unrelated proceedings. The father also sought orders concerning parental responsibility, the child's living arrangements, and time spent with each parent. The dispute involved allegations of past family violence, ongoing parental drug use, and psychological instability.

The court was required to determine whether the judicial officer should disqualify himself based on the apprehended bias claim, and if not, to make final parenting orders for the child. This involved assessing the risk of family violence, the child's best interests, the meaningfulness of relationships, and the capacity of the parents and maternal grandmother to facilitate the child's relationships with others. The court also had to consider whether the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted and, if so, to allocate parental responsibility accordingly, including determining with whom the child should live and spend time.

Austin J dismissed the father's disqualification application, finding that any association was remote and insufficient to give rise to substantial grounds for disqualification. The father had also unreasonably delayed his objection, leading to a waiver of the application. Regarding the parenting orders, the court found that the father was the principal perpetrator of past family violence and had failed to acknowledge his behaviour. While no present family violence was evident, the court found that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted due to the parents' histories of illegal drug use and psychological instability. The court concluded that the child was not exposed to an unacceptable risk of family violence and that the maternal grandmother was willing and able to facilitate the child's relationships.

Consequently, the court ordered that the maternal grandmother have sole parental responsibility for the child, with the child to live with her. The father was granted supervised time with the child for four hours every fourth weekend, with the supervisor to be nominated by a contact centre, and the father to bear the costs. The child was also to have written communication with the father. The mother's time with the child was left to the discretion of the maternal grandmother. The court also made orders restraining denigration, requiring notification of medical emergencies, and mandating therapy for the child with a clinician.