Lovelock, Re S.J. & Anor Bankrupts, Ex Parte The

Case [1988] FCA 587


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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1
GENERAL DIVISION
) E885 QLD Of 1986
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND

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RE:  STEPHEN JOHN LOVELOCK and
HENREIKE GERADA  PlARIA LOVELOCK
EX PARTE: THE BANKRUPTS

MINUTES OF ORDER

MAKING JUDGE ORDER: PINCUS J.
ORDER:  DATE OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1988
WHERE MADE:  BRISBANE

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THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. the bankrupts be and they hereby are discharged

from their bankruptcy.

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NOTE :  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
- Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION . . ) QLD E885 Of 1986
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
RE:  STEPHEN JOHN LOVELOCK and
HENREIKE GERADA NARIA LOVELOCK
EX PARTE: THE BANKRUPTS

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PINCUS J. 19 September 1988

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These applications for discharge from bankruptcy relate

to two persons, husband and wife, who became bankrupt on their own
petition on 2 October 1986, somewhat less than two years ago. The
evidence is that there are three creditors, Mr P.J. Kelly who has
appeared today by Mr Percy, Mr S.J. Lovelock, and a Mr Jurd.
The cause of the bankruptcy is said to be the failure of
a restaurant business in Sydney which the two bankrupts opened in

1981.   The major creditor, Mr Kelly, is said In the affidavit to

have had a dual role; that is, he was the owner of the shopping
complex in which the restaurant was situated and he was also a ,
guarantor of debts incurred by the bankrupts in relation to the
setting up of that business.

The business was a failure and there is nothing in the

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materlal to suggest that that was the fault of the bankrupts
except in the'sense, of course, that they must have made some

error, whether in selection of site or otherwise, to produce the result which ensued. However, it is a matter of common knowledge that many restaurants fail and it is by no means unusual to find

the failure resultlng in a bankruptcy as it has here.
The report of the trustee, Mr Adsett, says that there
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has been a proof of the debt from Mr Kelly in the sum of
$56,617.93. The other creditors have not lodged proofs and there
is no money in either estate from which a dividend might be paid.
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M r Percy has informed me that Mr Kelly claims that the sum due to
him is in fact of the order of $90,000, there having been another
$40,000 lost. The period which has elapsed, namely about two
years, is such as to enable one to say that there has been a

substantial time durlng which the bankrupts have suffered the

disabllities attaching to that status.

The matter which has concerned me somewhat is the
position of Mr Kelly. There is an affidavit by Mr R.I.C. Hirst,
the managing director of a company called Tucker and Co. Australia
Proprietary Limited, which I have read, which explains that Mr

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S.J. Lovelock, the male bankrupt, now has a good position with I.
good prospects which will be improved, or may well be improved, if

the applications are granted.

The law, as I understand it, is that it is necessary to

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show some good reason to found the jurisdiction to order a !
premature discharge. Even when a good reason is shown, however,
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there is still a discretion to refuse a discharge, if in the

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circumstances that seems to be the proper course. Here it appears

to be plain enough that there is a good reason for a discharge,

i namely the circumstances as set out in the affidavit of Mr Hirst,
those matters not being challenged. It remains to be considered,
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however, whether the objection by IsIr Percy on behalf of Hr Kelly
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The purposes of doing so would be two-fold. One is, so
l to speak, to let the ordinary penalty for business failure I-.
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operate; secondly, and more importantly perhaps, to increase the I ..
pressure upon Mr S.J. Lovelock, in particular, to try to produce
some money for n r Kelly. I have, in the end, determined that I

should not give effect to those considerations.

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I think it is right to say, as Mr Templeton has argued,

that the mere fact that a creditor or credrtors will be unpaid is

not in itself a reason to refuse the discharge. It is, of course, !

a necessary consequence of there berng a bankruptcy that the

remedy which would otherwise be available against the bankrupt is
at an end and that the creditors' access is only to the assets in
the estate, which here are nil. It seems to me that the proper
course is to order a discharge in each case and it will be so I ..
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ordered. i certify that this and the ,& preceding
pages are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment hcrein of HIS Honour
Mr. Justice Pincus e-+>
l Associate
Details
AGLC
Lovelock, Re S.J. & Anor Bankrupts, Ex Parte The [1988] FCA 587
Case
[1988] FCA 587
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, General Division, Pincus J considered an application for discharge from bankruptcy made by Stephen John Lovelock and Henreike Gerada Naria Lovelock, husband and wife. The court had to decide whether the applicants should be discharged from their bankruptcy, granted on their own petition on 2 October 1986, considering the interests of their creditors. The primary creditor, Mr. P.J. Kelly, claimed to be owed a substantial sum due to his role as both the owner of the shopping complex where the applicants' restaurant was located and a guarantor of the debts incurred by the applicants in setting up the business. The business failed, and the applicants had no assets from which to pay their creditors. The court considered the applicants' circumstances and the potential benefits of their discharge, including the prospect of future earnings for Mr. Lovelock. The judge concluded that while creditors would remain unpaid, this alone was not a sufficient reason to deny discharge. Instead, the court focused on the applicants' ability to contribute to their creditors' losses post-discharge and decided to grant the discharge, considering the applicants' prospects and the impracticality of expecting them to liquidate assets that did not exist.

Pincus J's reasoning emphasised the discretionary nature of bankruptcy discharge, noting that while good reasons for early discharge exist, the court retains a discretion to refuse it. The judge found that the applicants had demonstrated a good reason for discharge due to Mr. Lovelock's promising employment prospects. However, the court also considered Mr. Kelly's objections, who argued for the continuation of the applicants' disabilities to pressure them into resolving his claim. Despite this, the judge decided against upholding the objection, asserting that the primary consequence of bankruptcy is the limitation of creditors' remedies to the estate's assets, which in this case, were nonexistent. The court ruled that the appropriate course of action was to discharge the applicants from their bankruptcy, highlighting that the mere existence of unpaid creditors did not justify denying the discharge.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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