Loveday v Sun Newspapers Ltd

Frederick Loveday brought an action for libel against Sun Newspapers Ltd. and Edgar Jay, the town clerk of Canterbury. The dispute arose from an article published in the Sun newspaper which contained extracts from a letter written by the secretary of the Canterbury District Unemployed Relief Council attacking the Canterbury Municipal Council regarding its refusal of relief work to Loveday. The same article included a statement in reply, made by the town clerk, alleging that Loveday had been refused further relief work due to "general unsatisfactory conduct, which included abuse of gangers and the spreading of restlessness among his fellow employees." The plaintiff sued for libel, but was nonsuited at trial. The matter proceeded to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and then to the High Court of Australia on appeal.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the occasion of the publication was one of qualified privilege for both defendants, and if so, whether there was sufficient evidence of malice to be left to the jury. Specifically, the court had to determine if the plaintiff had authorised the letter sent to the newspaper, which was a prerequisite for establishing privilege in this context, and whether the newspaper proprietor, as distinct from the town clerk, was entitled to the protection of qualified privilege.

The High Court, by a majority, held that if the plaintiff authorised the sending of the letter to the newspaper, then the occasion was one of qualified privilege for both the town clerk and the newspaper proprietor. Latham C.J. and Starke J. found that there was undisputed evidence at the trial that the plaintiff had authorised the letter. They reasoned that the plaintiff, having chosen the public press to air his grievance, could not complain if the defendant used the same medium for a relevant reply. This privilege extended to the newspaper proprietor publishing the town clerk's response. However, Dixon J. dissented on the newspaper proprietor's entitlement to privilege, finding that on the evidence presented, a jury was not bound to find the plaintiff had authorised the letter. He concluded that in the absence of such authorisation, the town clerk was entitled to privilege, but the newspaper proprietor was not.

Consequently, Latham C.J. and Starke J. held that the judgment of nonsuit had been rightly entered in respect of both defendants. Dixon J. held that the nonsuit was rightly entered in respect of the town clerk, but not in respect of the newspaper proprietor. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with no order as to costs.