Lo Presti v The Queen

This matter concerns an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Joseph Francis Lo Presti against a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The central dispute revolved around whether the Honourable Mr Justice Teague, a judge of the Court of Criminal Appeal, ought to have been disqualified from hearing the applicant's appeal due to alleged bias. The applicant contended that Mr Justice Teague's prior involvement with him when His Honour was president of the Law Institute of Victoria created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was to determine the parameters of the test for apprehended bias, specifically as laid down in *Grassby*, and the objective standard of facts required to satisfy this test in the context of the applicant's apprehension of not receiving a fair hearing. The applicant argued that the reasonable bystander, representing the public's perception, should not be attributed with an overly sophisticated understanding of judicial impartiality, particularly regarding a judge's capacity to set aside prior views. The applicant's submission was that the circumstances surrounding Mr Justice Teague's prior involvement, which included a finding of professional misconduct by the Secretary of the Law Institute and the subsequent appointment of a tribunal by Mr Justice Teague in his presidential capacity, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The High Court considered the nature of Mr Justice Teague's involvement, noting that it primarily consisted of signing a document appointing members to a tribunal, following a preliminary finding of professional misconduct by the Secretary of the Law Institute. The Court also examined the wording of the relevant legislation, which referred to the Secretary being "of opinion" rather than making a definitive "finding" of misconduct. The applicant's argument centred on the perception of bias from a member of the public, who might not appreciate the judicial capacity to remain impartial despite prior involvement. The Court was tasked with assessing whether these circumstances met the threshold for apprehended bias under the *Grassby* test, considering the objective standard of a reasonable, albeit not necessarily legally trained, bystander.