Little v Police

This case concerned an appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia following a conviction for culpable driving causing death. The appellant, the driver of a Nissan utility vehicle, was involved in a collision with a Mazda four-wheel drive vehicle driven by the deceased, Mr. Von Duve. The collision occurred at a Y-junction where Glynns Road, on which the appellant was travelling, met Pudneys Road, on which the deceased was travelling. The appellant was required to give way to traffic on Pudneys Road. The appellant’s account was that he was travelling at approximately 80 km/h on Glynns Road, slowing to between 50 and 60 km/h as he entered the turn, and first saw the deceased’s vehicle as he was already committed to the turn.

The legal issues before the Supreme Court included whether the appellate judge erred in his assessment of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. Specifically, the appellant argued that the judge had incorporated the appellant's knowledge of a customary driving practice on that type of road surface into the objective standard of care, thereby holding the appellant to a higher standard. This practice involved drivers positioning their vehicles closer to the centre of the road to utilise the better surface. The appellant also contended that the judge failed to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence when considering the ground of appeal that the Magistrate's verdict was unreasonable, unsatisfactory, and against the weight of the evidence.

The Court found that the appellate judge had correctly applied the objective standard of care, which required a driver to exercise a level of defensiveness appropriate to the circumstances. The judge recognised that the standard of care was an objective determination and that a defensive driver should foresee the general possibility of danger at a junction, including the risk that another driver might not adhere to the required standard of care. The Court held that the judge did not expect a reasonably prudent driver to know of the specific customary practice or to drive in anticipation of another driver departing from it. Instead, the judge considered that a defensive outlook encompassed foreseeing a range of potential dangers at the junction. The Court also found that the judge had fulfilled his obligation to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence.

The Court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal were substantiated and therefore dismissed the appeal.