Leonie Cameron v Qantas Airways Limited

[1993] FCA 1081

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
1

NEW SOUTH WALES DIS	TRICT REGISTRY	)	No. G205 of 1993
1
GENERAJ, DIVISION	1

BETWEEN :

LEONIE CAMERON

Applicant

AND

QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED

Respondent

CORAM: Beaumont J .

DATE : 20 August 1993

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application is made by the respondent under order 62 subrule 3 that the costs ordered in its favour on 13 May, an order made by Davies J and on 14 July, my own order, be taxed forthwith.

I have had written submissions from each of the parties on the point. It is clear that order 62 subrule 3 confers a discretion. It would seem that unless there is a special reason to do so, the discretion should not be exercised (C.£. Thunderdome Race Timina and Scorina Ptv Limited v Dorian Industries Ptv Limited (1992) 36 FCR 397 .)

On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that the discretion should be exercised by reason of the following circumstances. First, that before Davies J, an application for an adjournment was not made until the respondent had commenced its submissions. Second, that the course which

should be taken by the applicant to put its pleadings in order was fully discussed before Davies J. Thirdly, that the effect of the order of the Court on 14 July 1993 was in substance that the applicant had leave to recommence, in a pleading sense, her action and next that the terms of the application suggest that it will be a substantial time before the principal proceedings are concluded.

On behalf of the applicant, in resisting the present claim, it is said that she brings these proceedings under new provisions dealing with representative proceedings about which there is considerable uncertainty. Reference is made to the decision in Poianand v NZ1 Securities Australia Ltd. (1992) 37 FCR 363. It is further said on behalf of the applicant that she is seeking to ventilate issues of considerable public importance which affect potentially many other people. Emphasis is made on behalf of the applicant of the circumstance that, as it is put in the submissions, she is "a mere consumerw seeking to prosecute a claim in the public interest and a taxation of costs order prior to the conclusion of the hearing which is contrary to the general principle envisaged by the rule, could seriously impede her capacity to prosecute the case. Reference is then made to the circumstances that there are special provisions for instance in section 33ZJ of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, dealing with this type of proceeding.

I propose to accede to the respondent's application. In my view the circumstances of the present case are special in that it would appear that in substance if not in form, the proceedings are about to be commenced de novo, that being so, I think that it is fair that the respondent should be entitled at this point in time, to have the benefit in practical terms of the costs orders made to date in its favour.

I certify that this and the preceding two

(2) pages are a true copy of the Reasons

f his Honour Mr.

Justice Be

Associate