Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lourey

In Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lourey, the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC) sought to enforce a summons issued to Michael Joseph Lourey for the production of documents, pursuant to section 520(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). Lourey applied to set aside the summons, contending that it was issued beyond the power of the LPCC and therefore invalid. The court was required to determine whether the summons was issued within the powers granted to the LPCC by the Act and whether it complied with the legal standards of reasonableness. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Order 36B applied to the summons and whether collateral review was available in this context.

The court found that the summons was authorised by section 520(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) and that there had been no abuse of statutory power. The LPCC had the benefit of the presumption in section 593(7) of the Act, which states that a document signed by a Law Complaints Officer and purporting to set out the nature of the power exercised and the manner in which it was exercised, is proof of the matters stated in it, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The court was satisfied that the summons was issued for the purpose of carrying out a complaint investigation in relation to Mr Lourey. Furthermore, the LPCC had reasonable cause to suspect Mr Lourey of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, as evidenced by the findings of the District Court in John v Denwest Nominees Pty Ltd t/as Cunderdin Roadhouse and the appeal proceedings to the Court of Appeal. These matters were capable of giving rise to a finding that Mr Lourey had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, as they may have been prejudicial to, or diminished public confidence in, the administration of justice, and brought the profession into disrepute.

The court also determined that the summons did not offend the legal standard of reasonableness as described by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li. The court accepted the argument that the institution and prosecution of the appeal to the Court of Appeal from the District Court Appeal proceedings was capable, as at 2 May 2017, of giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the appeal constituted an abuse of process. The limited scope of the appeal and its likely cost created an arguable conflict between the interests of Mr Johnson and those of his lawyers. The court concluded that the summons was not beyond power and therefore valid.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Lourey's application to set aside the summons. The summons was found to be within the powers granted to the LPCC by the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) and complied with the legal standards of reasonableness. The Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Order 36B did not apply to the summons, and collateral review was not available in this context.