Leesa Jan Alexander v Akis Emmanouel Livas

Leesa Jan Alexander, the appellant, brought a case against Akis Emmanouel Livas, the respondent, before the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The dispute revolves around allegations of sexual intercourse without consent, specifically where the consent of a prostitute was induced by fraud. Alexander alleged that Livas engaged in sexual intercourse with her without her consent, which was obtained through fraudulent means. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for committal, where the central legal issue was whether it was open to a jury to conclude that the alleged misrepresentation was about a matter of fact rather than a promise about future conduct. This interpretation hinged on section 67(1)(g) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The court had to decide whether this section should be read down so as not to apply to fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged by the appellant.

The court considered the language of section 67(1)(g) and determined that it should not be read down to exclude fraudulent misrepresentation. The court held that the section could apply to such circumstances and that it was open to a jury to find that the alleged misrepresentation was about a matter of fact. The court reasoned that the distinction between a matter of fact and a promise about future conduct was not as clear-cut as suggested and that the jury was entitled to make such a finding based on the evidence presented. Consequently, the court concluded that Livas was to be committed for trial on the charge of sexual intercourse without consent.