Lazarus v Independent Commission Against Corruption

In *Lazarus v Independent Commission Against Corruption*, the applicants, Lazarus and another, sought to challenge the validity of a New South Wales statute that retrospectively validated certain acts of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The dispute arose in the context of pending criminal appeals by the applicants against their convictions, where the validity of the ICAC's actions was central to their grounds of appeal. The matter was heard by McColl, Leeming, and Simpson JJA of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the statute, by validating past ICAC actions that were beyond its power, impermissibly interfered with the judicial process or was repugnant to the integrity of the judicial function, thereby infringing the implied constitutional limitation on State legislative power derived from Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. Additionally, the Court was required to determine whether the statute, on its proper construction, extended to validating acts connected with pending criminal proceedings, particularly where the evidence used in the Crown case against one applicant was obtained pursuant to invalid summonses, and the other applicant was convicted of giving false evidence to the ICAC during an investigation that was beyond its power. The Court also considered whether the presumption against retrospectivity prevented the statute from applying to validate conduct that was the subject of pending criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the statute did not offend Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. It held that the validation of past ICAC actions, even those relevant to pending criminal appeals, did not constitute an impermissible interference with the judicial process or a repugnancy to the integrity of the judicial function. The Court found that the statute's purpose was to cure defects in the ICAC's past conduct, not to dictate the outcome of judicial proceedings. Regarding statutory construction, the Court determined that the statute, by its plain language, was intended to apply retrospectively and to validate the impugned ICAC actions, notwithstanding their connection to pending criminal proceedings. The presumption against retrospectivity was displaced by the clear legislative intent.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' summons and ordered them to pay the costs of the respondents.