Lashansky v Coombs [No 3]

In the matter of Lashansky v Coombs [No 3], the plaintiff sought an extension of time to comply with a springing order that had been made in the defendants' favour in relation to their application for summary judgment. The defendants had applied for summary judgment in the defamation action brought by the plaintiff, and the springing order provided that if the plaintiff did not provide an amended statement of claim within a specified period, judgment would be entered for the defendants. The plaintiff sought an extension of time to comply with the springing order on the grounds of his inability to afford legal representation and his ongoing attempts to secure funding for his case.

The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff had provided sufficient grounds for an extension of time to comply with the springing order, and if so, whether it was in the interests of justice to grant the extension. The court noted that while the authority to extend the time for compliance with a springing order was well established, the ultimate sanction effected by the operation of a springing order could not be avoided by showing that non-compliance came about by the same sort of inattention or laxity that caused the order to be made in the first place. The court also noted that there were several matters it would normally have regard to in deciding whether to extend the time for compliance with a springing order, including the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made, the reason for non-compliance with the springing order, the prejudice to the defaulting party if the time were not extended, and the prejudice to the other party if the time were extended.

The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient grounds for an extension of time to comply with the springing order. The plaintiff had not shown that his inability to afford legal representation or his ongoing attempts to secure funding for his case were sufficient grounds for an extension of time, particularly given that the alleged defamation occurred over six years prior to the commencement of the action. The court also found that the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made did not provide any basis on which the court should exercise its discretion to extend the time, as the plaintiff had failed to provide an amended statement of claim or a draft of a proposed amended statement of claim, and had not particularised the republication(s) on which he relied. The court held that the plaintiff's non-compliance with the springing order came about by the same sort of inattention or laxity that caused the order to be made in the first place, and that granting an extension of time would undermine the authority of the court.

The court declined to grant the plaintiff an extension of time to comply with the springing order, and held that judgment should be entered for the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had had ample opportunity to provide an amended statement of claim that complied with the requirements of the court, and that further delay would not be countenanced. The court also noted that there was no point in resuscitating a case that was devoid of merit, and that the plaintiff's failure to provide an amended statement of claim that set out a cause of action for defamation meant that there was no case to answer.