Knightsbridge North Lawyers Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 2)

The application was brought by Knightsbridge North Lawyers Pty Ltd against the State of New South Wales. The applicants sought a declaration that the appointments of the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) were invalid. The dispute centred on the compliance with statutory provisions concerning the appointment process and the validity of the appointments following legislative amendments. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issues involved the interpretation of section 64A of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) and the Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2016 (NSW). Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the failure to refer the appointment of the Chief Commissioner to the Parliamentary Joint Committee resulted in invalid appointments, and whether section 64A required the Joint Committee to deliberate for at least a day before making its decision. Another issue was whether the consultation required by section 5(2) of the Amendment Act had to be completed before the Chief Commissioner's appointment, and if this affected the validity of the appointments.

The court held that the appointments of the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners of ICAC were valid. It concluded that section 64A did not necessitate the Joint Committee to consider referred appointments for a specific duration before making its decision and communicating it. Furthermore, the court found that the consultation required by section 5(2) of the Amendment Act could be undertaken before the Chief Commissioner's appointment without invalidating the appointments. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the applicants. Additionally, the court ruled that clause 19A of the Amendment (Commissioners) Regulation 2017 (NSW) was valid, as it was of a savings or transitional nature, in accordance with section 26 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). The opinion required by section 7(c) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1995 (NSW) was not relevant, and there was a presumption of validity under section 45 of the Interpretation Act and section 9(1) of the Subordinate Legislation Act. The opinion was also unlikely to be privileged under section 118 of the Evidence Act 1995, as the State was not considered a client of the Attorney or Parliamentary Counsel who provided the opinion.