KN & SD & Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

The appeal concerned the interaction between the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) and the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The appellant mother, a citizen of the Russian Federation and an unlawful non-citizen in Australia, sought to prevent her deportation from Australia. She argued that her deportation would be contrary to the best interests of her child, born in Australia to an Australian father, and that this consideration should inform the interpretation of the *Migration Act*. The primary judge had declined to make the orders sought by the mother, including an injunction to restrain her removal from Australia.

The central legal issues before the Full Court were whether the phrase "reasonably practicable" in section 198(6) of the *Migration Act* should be construed in light of the objects expressed in section 60B of the *Family Law Act*, and whether the Family Court of Australia possessed the power to restrain the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs from deporting an unlawful non-citizen parent based on the principles of child welfare enshrined in section 60B of the *Family Law Act* or international instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court was also asked to consider whether these provisions conferred fundamental rights upon children to have contact with their parents.

The Full Court, in dismissing the appeal, affirmed the primary judge's reasoning. Their Honours held that the phrase "reasonably practicable" in section 198(6) of the *Migration Act* referred to practical impediments to removal, such as the availability of travel documents or transport, and did not encompass considerations of the best interests of a child. They found that the *Migration Act* was intended to operate independently of the *Family Law Act* in this regard, and that the ordinary meaning of the words in section 198(6) did not permit the interpretation advanced by the mother. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the *Family Law Act* did not grant it the power to make orders that would restrain departmental officers from performing their mandatory duties under the *Migration Act*, particularly where such orders would impose duties not otherwise imposed by that Act. The Court also noted that while the child's best interests were paramount in parenting orders under the *Family Law Act*, this principle did not extend to overriding the statutory obligations of immigration authorities under the *Migration Act*.

The appeal was dismissed.