Klement and Glynn

In this matter before Dawe J, the mother sought leave to request the Child Support Registrar to exercise a discretion under section 98S of the *Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989*. The father contended that the mother's application was a sham, designed to circumvent her failure to pursue appropriate review avenues for the Registrar's decision and her inability to obtain an extension of time for such review. The father argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application, relying on the procedures for internal objections to administrative assessments outlined in the *Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988*.

The central legal issue was whether the Court had the jurisdiction to grant the mother leave to apply under section 111 of the *Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989* for the Registrar to exercise the discretion under section 98S, particularly given the time elapsed since the relevant child support assessments were in force. The court was required to determine if the mother's application fell within the scope of section 111, which permits applications for leave concerning child support periods more than 18 months but less than seven years prior to the application date.

Dawe J reasoned that while section 111 and section 98S, which allows the Registrar to vary factors including a parent's child support percentage, appeared to apply to the periods the mother sought to challenge, a critical prerequisite was that an administrative assessment must be in force at the time a carer requests a departure. The mother's own submissions indicated that the initial assessment she challenged, operating from 1 October 2005, was no longer in force, having been superseded by a later assessment from 3 October 2006. Consequently, the condition stipulated in section 98B, requiring an administrative assessment to be in force, was not met.

Paragraph 13 of the mother’s Amended Initiating Application was dismissed.