Kamara and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)

This matter concerned an application for Australian citizenship where the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs sought to cancel the approval of the applicant's application on character grounds. The applicant, Mr Kamara, had not yet made the pledge of commitment, meaning the approval was still subject to reconsideration. The dispute centred on whether the applicant was of "good character" as required by the relevant legislation. The decision was made by Deputy President McDermott of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was to determine whether the applicant was "not of good character" for the purposes of section 25(2)(b)(iii) of the Act. If this threshold was met, the Tribunal then had to consider whether to exercise the discretion under section 25(1) of the Act to cancel the approval of the citizenship application. The Tribunal was bound by the Federal Court's decision in *Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* (2015) 231 FCR 128, which affirmed the executive's power to reconsider citizenship approvals prior to the pledge of commitment.

The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant had not yet become an Australian citizen as he had not made the pledge of commitment. The core of the decision rested on the interpretation of "good character," which the Tribunal noted was not defined in the Act. Drawing on existing case law, including *Re Lachmaiya* and *Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs*, the Tribunal understood "good character" to refer to a person's enduring moral qualities, rather than their reputation or standing in the community. The applicant's reliance on statutory declarations and letters of support was found insufficient, particularly as the authors had not been called as witnesses and their appreciation of the cancellation's reason was unclear. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not appreciate the importance of providing correct information in an application.

Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to cancel the approval of the application for Australian citizenship, exercising the discretion under section 25(1) of the Act. The Tribunal found no reasons to refrain from exercising this discretion, noting that the decision did not prejudice the applicant's visa status and that he retained the right to make a further application for citizenship.