Johnson v Native Title Registrar

[2014] FCA 577

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 577

Citation:	Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 577
Appeal from:	Application for leave to appeal: Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 142
Parties:	ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON v NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR and STATE OF QUEENSLAND
File number(s):	QUD 117 of 2014
Judge(s):	DOWSETT J
Date of judgment:	4 April 2014
Date of hearing:	4 April 2014
Place:	Brisbane
Division:	GENERAL DIVISION
Category:	No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:	3
Solicitor for the Applicant:	The Applicant did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent:	Holding Redlich Lawyers
Solicitors for the Second Respondent:	Crown Law

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	QUD 117 of 2014

BETWEEN:	ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON Applicant
AND:	NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR First Respondent
STATE OF QUEENSLAND Second Respondent
JUDGE:	DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:	4 APRIL 2014
WHERE MADE:	BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.the application be refused.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	QUD 117 of 2014

BETWEEN:	ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON Applicant
AND:	NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR First Respondent
STATE OF QUEENSLAND Second Respondent
JUDGE:	DOWSETT J
DATE:	4 APRIL 2014
PLACE:	BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against a decision by a Judge of the Court, upholding an application for summary judgment. In the proceedings in question, the applicant sought the removal of the details of an ILUA from the register maintained by the National Native Title Tribunal.  A perusal of the papers and his Honour’s reasons indicates that the ground upon which he sought to rely was that of duress.  His Honour concluded that duress could not be made out on the evidence.

2. The applicant initially filed a notice of appeal but was advised that, because his Honour’s decision was interlocutory, leave was necessary.  He was, at that stage, out of time in which to apply for leave to appeal and so, on the advice of the Court, applied for an extension of time in which to apply.  The matter was listed for hearing today.  Prior to the hearing, the applicant contacted the Court, asking whether or not he would be allowed to appear by telephone.  In view of the nature of the proceedings, I considered that course to be inappropriate.  He may also have indicated a desire to be represented by somebody other than a legal practitioner.  I may well have discouraged him from doing so.  Nobody has, today, sought to appear for him.

3. He has, however, provided submissions in the form of an affidavit. Neither the purported notice of appeal nor the affidavit takes the matter any further than the evidence which was before his Honour.  No basis is demonstrated for challenging his Honour’s finding that a case based on duress enjoyed no reasonable prospects of success.  In those circumstances I consider that, although he was just out of time, there being no reasonable prospects of success, the application should be refused.

I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.

Associate:

Dated:       3 June 2014