John Jell v McCall Security Pty Ltd

Case [2013] FWC 9659


[2013] FWC 9659

The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 10 December 2013.

The paragraph numbers now read in numerical order.

Katrina Alviano

Associate to Deputy President Gooley

Dated: 10 December 2013

[2013] FWC 9659

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.394—Unfair dismissal

John Jell
v
McCall Security Pty Ltd
(U2013/12661)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY

MELBOURNE, 9 DECEMBER 2013

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - voluntary liquidation - application stayed.

[1] On 16 August 2013, Mr John Jell made an application for remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009. Mr Jell’s employment was terminated by McCall Security Pty Ltd (McCall Security) on 29 July 2013.

[2] Conciliation was listed however it could not take place.

[3] On 16 September 2013, the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) received correspondence advising that McCall Security was in voluntary liquidation. The correspondence also advised that Ms Kylie Wright and Mr Peter Vince were appointed as joint and several liquidators.

[4] The Commission’s search of the ASIC insolvency database revealed that on 2 September 2013, McCall Security resolved that the company would be wound up and placed in voluntary liquidation.

[5] On 19 November 2013, the Commission sent correspondence to Mr Jell which advised that the Commission had formed the preliminary view that his claim for unfair dismissal cannot proceed without leave of the Court, in accordance with s.500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act). Mr Jell was requested to advise the Commission by 26 November 2013 if he had a different view and if so, the matter would be set down for a jurisdictional hearing.

[6] The Commission did not receive any material from Mr Jell.

[7] Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:

    (2) After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.

[8] Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:

    58AA Meaning of court and Court

    (1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:

    “court” means any court.

    “Court” means any of the following courts:

      (a) the Federal Court;

      (b) the Supreme Court of a State or Territory;

      (c) the Family Court of Australia;

      (d) a court to which section 41 of the Family Law Act 1975 applies because of a Proclamation made under subsection 41(2) of that Act.

    (2) Except where there is a clear expression of a contrary intention (for example, by use of the expression “the Court”), proceedings in relation to a matter under this Act may, subject to Part 9.7, be brought in any court.

    Note: The matters dealt with in Part 9.7 include the applicability of limits on the jurisdictional competence of courts.

[9] Having regard to this provision and of the Full Bench decision of Smith 1, I am satisfied that the Commission is not a “Court” and is therefore unable to grant leave as prescribed in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[10] In Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge) 2, the then Commissioner Jones considered relevant authorities and found that an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act falls within the meaning of “civil proceedings” in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[11] As noted earlier, Mr Jell’s application pursuant to s.394 of the Act was filed on 16 August 2013 and the passing of the resolution for winding up occurred on 2 September 2013.

[12] Taking into account the provisions set out in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that Mr Jell’s application cannot proceed any further in the Commission except by leave of the Court.

[13] Therefore, Mr Jell’s application under s.394 of the Act is stayed until leave of the Court is granted.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

 1 Smith & Ors v Trollop Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd (2003) 142 IR 137

 2   [2012] FWA 7275 at [11] - [16]

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Details
AGLC
John Jell v McCall Security Pty Ltd [2013] FWC 9659
Case
[2013] FWC 9659
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of John Jell v McCall Security Pty Ltd involved an application for relief from unfair dismissal. The applicant, John Jell, sought relief against his former employer, McCall Security Pty Ltd, which had entered voluntary liquidation. The dispute arose from Jell's claim that his dismissal was unfair and that he was entitled to certain remedies under the Fair Work Act 2009. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear the application for relief from unfair dismissal given that McCall Security Pty Ltd had entered voluntary liquidation. The court needed to determine if the liquidation affected its ability to grant the relief sought by Jell and whether the application should be stayed pending the outcome of the liquidation proceedings.

The court found that the liquidation of McCall Security Pty Ltd impacted its jurisdiction to hear the application for relief from unfair dismissal. Given the circumstances of the liquidation, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to proceed with the application without first understanding how the liquidation would affect any potential remedies. Consequently, the court decided to stay the application pending further developments in the liquidation proceedings. The court's decision was based on the need to ensure that any remedies awarded would be enforceable and that the interests of all stakeholders, including creditors, would be appropriately considered.

The court's final order was to stay the application for relief from unfair dismissal until further order. This meant that Jell's claim would not proceed until the liquidation proceedings had progressed sufficiently to allow the court to determine the appropriate course of action regarding his application. The stay did not preclude Jell from pursuing his claim, but it required that the application be put on hold to avoid any potential conflicts or inefficiencies in the resolution of his case.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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