Jewell v Director of Public Prosecutions

The appeal before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, constituted by Mossop and Taylor JJ and Ainslie-Wallace AJ, concerned a challenge to sentences imposed on the appellant for aggravated threat to kill, aggravated stalking, contravening a Family Violence Order, and breaching a Good Behaviour Order. The appellant sought leave to amend their notice of appeal to introduce new grounds relating to the primary judge's alleged failure to properly apply the principles established in *Bugmy* and *Verdins*, particularly concerning the weight given to pro-social factors and childhood experiences in assessing the risk of reoffending. Additionally, the appellant sought leave to argue that the primary judge erred in the discount applied to the sentences, contending that a single discount should have been imposed for multiple pleas of guilty.

The court was required to determine whether to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal on the grounds relating to the application of *Bugmy* and *Verdins*, and whether the primary judge erred in the sentencing discounts applied. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the individual and overall sentences imposed were manifestly excessive, and whether the primary judge had applied excessive accumulation to the individual sentences, given the short period over which the offending occurred and the differing criminality of each offence. A further issue involved the interpretation of s 35(4) of the *Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005* (ACT) in conjunction with s 145 of the *Legislation Act 2001* (ACT), specifically whether a reference to a singular charge in s 35(4) should be interpreted to include plural charges for the purpose of imposing a single overall discount.

Regarding the proposed amendments concerning *Bugmy* and *Verdins*, the court found that the existing grounds of appeal already encompassed arguments about the weight of pro-social factors and childhood experiences in relation to the risk of reoffending, and therefore, leave to amend was not granted. The court also declined to grant leave to appeal on the issue of sentencing discounts, reasoning that imposing a single discount for multiple pleas would obscure the individualised nature of the sentencing exercise, especially given the overwhelming strength of the prosecution's case on two charges and the differing criminality of the offences. The court interpreted s 35(4) of the *Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005* (ACT) narrowly, holding that it did not permit an expanded interpretation to include plural charges for the purpose of a single overall discount, noting the operational difficulties and the absence of power in the Act to impose aggregate sentences for multiple offences.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that the individual and overall sentences were not manifestly excessive and that further concurrency would have risked eliding the seriousness of the individual acts, given that the offending occurred over a single month and the criminality of each offence differed substantially.