JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning an oral agreement between J.C. Williamson Ltd. (appellant) and Lukey and Mulholland (respondents). The respondents, who operated a sweets shop, were granted an exclusive licence to sell confectionery within the appellant's theatre and its precincts for a period of five years. This agreement was not in writing. The respondents took over a lease for the shop and commenced selling sweets in the theatre, making the agreed weekly payments. However, the appellant later repudiated the agreement and revoked the licence. The respondents sought an injunction to restrain this revocation and damages for breach of contract.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the oral agreement, which was not to be performed within one year and therefore fell within the Statute of Frauds, could be enforced in equity despite the lack of a written memorandum. Specifically, the court had to determine if the doctrine of part performance could be invoked to grant an injunction or specific performance, and consequently, whether damages could be awarded in lieu of such equitable relief. The court also considered whether the nature of the agreement was such that a court of equity would, in principle, grant relief.

The High Court held that the agreement could not be performed within one year and was therefore subject to the Statute of Frauds. It further determined that the contract was not one that equity would enforce by specific performance, primarily because it involved continuous supervision and personal services, and lacked a proprietary interest that equity typically protects. Consequently, an injunction could not be granted on the ground of part performance to restrain the revocation of the licence or the admission of others to sell sweets. As the equitable remedies of specific performance or injunction were unavailable, the court concluded that damages could not be awarded in lieu thereof under section 62(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1928 (Vict.). The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria was reversed.