J.F. Thompson (Qld) Pty Ltd v Price

This matter came before the High Court of Australia on an application for special leave to appeal. The applicant, J.F. Thompson (Qld) Pty Ltd, sought to appeal a decision concerning the timeliness of an action commenced by the respondent, Ian David Edward Price. Mr Price, a former employee of the applicant, had commenced proceedings for damages for negligence and breach of duty on 8 July 1985, alleging personal injury sustained in the course of his employment. The applicant contended that the action was statute-barred under section 11 of the *Limitation of Actions Act* (Qld), as it was commenced three years and two days after the cause of action arose. The respondent argued that section 38(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act* (Qld) extended the time for commencement to the next following Monday, 8 July 1985, because 6 July 1985, the actual expiry date, fell on a Saturday.

The central legal issues before the court were twofold. Firstly, whether section 11 of the *Limitation of Actions Act* (Qld) "prescribes, allows or reckons" a period of time for the doing of anything within the meaning of section 38(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act* (Qld). Secondly, if it did, whether the operation of section 38(3) was excluded by the words "notwithstanding any other Act or law or rule of law" contained within section 11 of the *Limitation of Actions Act*. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland had been divided on these questions, with the majority holding that section 11 did prescribe a period for the institution of proceedings, and that section 38(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act* applied, while a dissenting judge found otherwise.

The applicant argued that unless the *Acts Interpretation Act* applied, the respondent's action was out of time. The critical question, therefore, was the proper construction of section 38(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act*, specifically whether the three-year period stipulated in section 11 of the *Limitation of Actions Act* constituted a period of time prescribed, allowed, or reckoned for the doing of something. The applicant submitted that the ordinary meanings of "prescribe" included "direct" and "enjoin," suggesting that section 11 did indeed prescribe a time limit. The court was therefore required to determine if the time limitation imposed by the *Limitation of Actions Act* was a period to which the provisions of the *Acts Interpretation Act* applied, and if so, whether any other statutory provision prevented its application.