Irwin v the Queen

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by the appellant against the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant had been convicted by a jury in the District Court of Queensland of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm to the complainant, who suffered a broken hip in three places following a confrontation. The appellant's defence included evidence that he had pushed the complainant, causing him to stumble backwards and fall. The central issue on appeal was whether the jury's verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, particularly in light of section 23(1) of the Criminal Code (Q), which provides that a person is not criminally responsible for an event that an ordinary person would not reasonably foresee as a possible consequence.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Court of Appeal erred in not finding the jury's verdict to be unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. This involved considering the application of section 23(1) of the Criminal Code (Q), specifically whether an ordinary person in the appellant's position could reasonably have foreseen the possibility of grievous bodily harm resulting from the appellant's actions. The Court also considered whether there was any material difference between what an ordinary person "could" reasonably foresee and what they "would" reasonably foresee in this context.

The High Court reasoned that the jury had been properly directed that they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an ordinary person in the appellant's position would reasonably have foreseen the possibility of grievous bodily harm, and that this possibility must have been real, not theoretical. The Court found no error in the Court of Appeal's assessment of the evidence, noting that the appellant's own evidence, combined with the medical evidence, supported an inference that the push was delivered with a considerable degree of force. The Court also clarified that the Court of Appeal's observation that "equally open" interpretations of the evidence existed did not mean the jury was bound to find reasonable doubt, but rather that different views of the evidence could lead to the conclusion that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.