Iongi v The Queen

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by the applicant, Iongi, against the respondent, The Queen. The dispute arose from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal which had upheld a trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse to sever an indictment. The indictment contained two counts, and the applicant argued that the trial judge erred in not directing separate trials for these counts.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in failing to hold that the trial judge had erred in refusing to direct separate trials. This question hinged on the admissibility of evidence. Specifically, the applicant contended that evidence admissible only in relation to one count was led at the trial of both counts, and that the jury was not adequately directed on how to treat this evidence.

The High Court considered the applicant's submissions, which acknowledged that evidence concerning the nature of sexual contacts between the applicant and the complainant was admissible for both counts as evidence of the relationship. The only evidence that was not admissible for both counts was evidence of a fresh complaint in respect of count 2. Crucially, the applicant's counsel conceded that no direction regarding this fresh complaint had been sought from the trial judge. Given this concession, and the fact that the applicant's counsel indicated difficulty in advancing the application further, the Court found that the applicant's argument was significantly undermined.

The High Court was not persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal was attended with sufficient doubt to justify granting special leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application for special leave to appeal was refused.