In the Matter of Robertson

The matter before the High Court of Australia concerned Timothy Frank Robertson, who appeared in person. The Attorney-General for the State of Queensland and the Bar Association of Queensland were represented by Mr G.L. Davies, QC. The parties had agreed to a stated case, with the exception of paragraph 7, which related to a question of fact.

The central legal issue was whether paragraph 7 of the stated case, concerning Mr Robertson's ability to practice principally in Queensland without foregoing his residence in Sydney, could be settled as an agreed fact. Mr Robertson contended that the question of what a hypothetical barrister might be able to do was irrelevant to his personal situation under section 117 of the Constitution. The court was required to determine how to proceed with this disputed factual assertion.

Mr Robertson argued that his personal affidavit, stating he could not practice principally in Queensland without foregoing his Sydney residence, was sufficient to establish the fact for the purposes of section 117. He submitted that the opposing contention, that a hypothetical barrister might be able to practice in Queensland while residing in Sydney, was a red herring and outside the scope of the constitutional provision which addressed his personal circumstances. The court considered the alternative of reforming paragraph 7 as an assertion by Mr Robertson and a denial by the respondents, or potentially standing the matter over.