Ibarcena v Cole

Case [2003] FCA 417


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ibarcena v Cole [2003] FCA 417

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) s 44, s 44A
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)

Cook v ASP Ship Management [2001] FCA 598 referred to

JEREMY PATRICK IBARCENA and ANOTHER v ANITA COLE and ANOTHER
A15 OF 2003

FINN J
14 APRIL 2003
CANBERRA


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A15 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

JEREMY PATRICK IBARCENA and ANOTHER
APPLICANT

AND:

ANITA COLE and ANOTHER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 APRIL 2003

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A15 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

JEREMY PATRICK IBARCENA and ANOTHER
APPLICANT

AND:

ANITA COLE and ANOTHER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

14 APRIL 2003

PLACE:

CANBERRA

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 31 March 2003 the applicants, Jeremy Patrick Ibarcena and Shirley Gibbons who are husband and wife, lodged an appeal in this court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and belatedly sought to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under s 44A of the Act for the purpose of staying the decision said to have been made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The short point before the Court today is whether the applicants have, in fact, enlivened this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under the Act.

  2. The matter in question arises under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) in respect of decisions taken originally by a delegate of the Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services in respect of overpayments said to have been made to each of the applicants. The original decision has been the subject of a number of internal appeals which led ultimately to an appeal by the applicants to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. On 18 March 2003 the Tribunal, constituted by Senior Member Sassella, heard the applications.

  3. In the course of those applications the Senior Member appeared to make intimations as to the likely outcome of the two applications before him (one from each of the applicants), or else, made comment on the relevance of documents placed before him.  On the evidence that has been filed in this matter on behalf of the respondents, it would appear that when the Senior Member heard the matter on that day, the Senior Member reserved his decision. 

  4. The Registrar of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has written two letters, both of which are in evidence.  The first, to the Australian Government Solicitor, confirms that the matter was heard and reserved by the Senior Member on that date and that no decision has been rendered.  The second, which accompanied the transmission of documentation to this Court, likewise indicates to the Court that as yet a decision has not been made by the Tribunal. A copy of the hearing report was attached to the second letter.  That hearing report indicates on its face (a) the fact that a hearing was held and (b) that no oral decision was given but, rather, that the decision was reserved.

  5. As was said by Spender J in his judgment in the decision of the Full Court in Cook v ASP Ship Management [2001] FCA 598 at [5], quoting from the joint judgment of the Full Court in Geographical Indications Committee v Hon O’Connor J and Others:

    “Section 44(1) [of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act] provides that a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding. … “[D]ecision” in section 44(1) has a restricted meaning. The meaning is confined to a final decision or determination.”

    His Honour went on to say [at 6]:

    “There is no right of appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act in respect of directions which are not matters of final decision or determination.”

    In the present matter, the evidence before me satisfies me that the Tribunal has not reached a determination in this matter at all.  The decision is reserved.  Equally, I am satisfied, given the requirement of finality, that the term “decision” does not apply to intimations of likely success in a proceeding, let alone as to comments on relevance.  For these reasons I am satisfied that the appeal, so called, in this matter is destined to inevitable failure for the reason that the jurisdiction to entertain the matter has not properly been enlivened.  There is simply no decision against which the alleged appeal is said to lie.

  6. The application is premature. Until a decision has been rendered this Court is not, under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, entitled to interfere.  For that reason, I dismiss the application in this matter.

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.

Associate:

Dated:             7 May 2003

Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Dubé
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing: 14 April 2003
Date of Judgment: 14 April 2003
Details
AGLC
Ibarcena v Cole [2003] FCA 417
Case
[2003] FCA 417
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to the dispute in Ibarcena v Cole were the applicant, Ibarcena, and the respondent, Cole. The nature of the dispute centred on an application for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The court involved in the matter was the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court revolved around the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in Australia. The court was required to determine whether there were any grounds upon which the enforcement of the arbitral award could be refused under the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act 1991 (Cth). Specifically, the court needed to examine if the award was final, if it had been made in a country that was a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and if there were any circumstances that would warrant refusing enforcement under section 10 of the Act.

The court's reasoning in Ibarcena v Cole focused on the grounds for refusing enforcement as outlined in the Arbitration Act. The court found that while the arbitral award was indeed final and had been made in a country that was party to the New York Convention, there were no grounds under section 10 of the Act that justified refusing enforcement. The court concluded that the application for enforcement of the arbitral award should proceed. However, due to procedural errors in the application, the court dismissed the application without prejudice to the applicant's right to refile the application once the errors were rectified.

No further orders were made in the decision, as the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing Ibarcena the opportunity to correct the procedural deficiencies and resubmit the application for enforcement.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

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