Hume Steel Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic)

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellant, Hume Steel Ltd., was the assignee of a lease granted by the Crown under the Land Act 1915 (Vic.). The dispute arose when the Crown resumed possession of the leased land, which was required by the Victorian Railways Commissioners for railway purposes. The core of the disagreement was whether the lessee was entitled to compensation for this resumption.

The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the construction of the lease agreement, specifically the interplay between clause 16 and clause D of the schedule. Clause 16 provided generally that if the land was required for any public purpose, the Crown could resume possession, but the lessee would be entitled to compensation for the value of its interest. In contrast, clause D, which was part of a written schedule incorporated into the lease, stipulated that if the land was required by the Victorian Railways Commissioners for railway purposes, the Crown could resume possession after giving six months' notice, and the lessee would not be entitled to any compensation. The court had to determine whether the specific provisions of clause D overrode the general provisions of clause 16, and if so, whether the lessee was precluded from claiming compensation for various losses, including the loss of use of improvements, re-establishment costs, business interruption, and loss of profits.

The High Court, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, held that the lessee was not entitled to compensation. The court reasoned that while clause 16 provided for compensation for resumption for public purposes, clause D specifically addressed resumption for railway purposes by the Victorian Railways Commissioners. The judges found that clause D, being a specific provision dealing with a particular situation, should prevail over the more general provision in clause 16. Several grounds supported this conclusion: clause D was incorporated into clause 12, which preceded clause 16; clause D was written while clause 16 was printed, with written provisions generally taking precedence; and the principle that specific provisions override general ones (generalia specialibus non derogant) applied. The court found no inconsistency that could not be reconciled by applying this principle, concluding that clause D effectively excluded compensation in the circumstances of the resumption.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.