Howley v Ghan [No 2]

Case [2019] SASC 22


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

HOWLEY v GHAN [NO 2]

[2019] SASC 22

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton

28 February 2019

PROCEDURE - COSTS - GENERAL RULE - COSTS FOLLOW THE EVENT

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - COSTS

Application for costs.

In Howley v Ghan [2019] SASC 4 this Court dismissed Mr Howley’s appeal against an order of a Magistrate striking out his claim filed in the Magistrates Court and dismissing his related action. This Court also allowed Dr Ghan’s cross-appeal against a costs order made by the Magistrate consequent upon the Magistrate striking out Mr Howley’s claim and dismissing his action. Subsequently, Dr Ghan made an application in this Court for his costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $2,750.

Held, allowing the application, Mr Howley is to pay Dr Ghan’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $2,000.

Howley v Ghan [2019] SASC 4, considered.

HOWLEY v GHAN [NO 2]
[2019] SASC 22

Magistrates Appeal

HINTON J:

  1. On 25 January 2019 I dismissed Mr Howley’s appeal against orders made by a Magistrate striking out a claim Mr Howley had filed in the Magistrates Court against Dr Ghan and dismissing the action.[1] At the same time I allowed Dr Ghan’s cross-appeal against the costs order made consequent upon the Magistrate striking out Mr Howley’s claim and dismissing the related action.

  2. Counsel for Dr Ghan applied for the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $2,750. Due to his ill health I had excused Mr Howley from attending judgment, undertaking to mail a copy of the judgment and perfected orders to him. This was done. In addition, the transcript of proceedings on 25 January 2019 was sent to Mr Howley and orders made giving him time in which to file written submissions in response to Dr Ghan’s application for costs.

  3. I indicated on 25 January 2019 that, subject to considering any written submissions that Mr Howley might wish to make, I was disposed to grant the application and order that Mr Howley pay Dr Ghan’s costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $2,000.

  4. On 19 February 2019 the Court received Mr Howley’s written submissions (FDN 6). In those written submissions Mr Howley takes the opportunity to question my integrity, accuse me of abusing his human rights, disagree with my judgment, identify where he says I went wrong and, to some extent, re-argue his appeal. Against this background he states:

    So the matter of costs is one I view with a great deal [of] contempt and state for the record I could not disagree any stronger.

    To pay costs to Dr Ghan is the same as asking holocaust survivors to pay restitution. This man is despicable as are you your Honour, you know costs are beyond my capacity to pay except in very small installments so do as you will – I intend to appeal.

  5. Ordinarily costs follow the event. Any litigant who appeals or contests an appeal does so bearing the risk of an adverse costs order. Impecuniosity does not immunise a litigant from costs. Rather, generally speaking, the courts operate on the basis that in instituting or defending proceedings a litigant will have weighed the risk of an adverse costs order and determined to run it. In this way, the risk of an adverse costs order often has a sobering effect on litigants.

  6. In my view Dr Ghan has done nothing in defending Mr Howley’s appeal and prosecuting his cross-appeal to disentitle him to an award of costs. No reason arises not to apply the ordinary rule. That rule does not entitle the successful party to full indemnification for all costs incurred. In this matter I am of the opinion that an award of costs in Dr Ghan’s favour fixed in the sum of $2,000 adequately compensates him for the cost incurred in defending Mr Howley’s appeal and prosecuting his own. In reaching this figure I have had regard to the fact that Dr Ghan would have incurred expense in instructing solicitors and obtaining advice from them on his and Mr Howley’s appeals. He would also be billed for the drafting, filing and service of his notice of cross-appeal and the written submissions filed in this Court in addition to having to pay counsel’s fee to attend the hearing of the appeal and cross-appeal (which lasted approximately one and a half hours) as well as judgment delivery.

  7. Accordingly, I order that Mr Howley pay Dr Ghan’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $2,000.


Details
AGLC
Howley v Ghan [No 2] [2019] SASC 22
Case
[2019] SASC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Howley v Ghan [No 2], the appellant, Howley, had previously brought an action against the respondent, Ghan, in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The proceedings were for the recovery of money owed. The original case was settled before trial, and a consent order was entered. However, subsequent to the settlement, Howley sought to appeal the costs order made by the magistrate, arguing that it was inappropriate. The Supreme Court of South Australia was tasked with determining whether the costs order was correct and if there were any grounds for altering it.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the magistrate's decision to award costs in the manner that it was done was correct. The court needed to examine the principles governing costs in such circumstances, particularly focusing on the general rule that costs follow the event. It was necessary to assess if there were any exceptional circumstances that would warrant a deviation from this rule. Additionally, the court had to consider the appropriateness of the costs awarded in light of the settlement and the consent order.

The Supreme Court found that the magistrate had exercised his discretion correctly in making the costs order. The court emphasised that costs generally follow the event, meaning that the losing party is typically responsible for the costs incurred by the winning party. In this case, the settlement and consent order did not alter the fact that the respondent was the prevailing party. The court held that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify a different allocation of costs. The costs awarded were deemed appropriate and in line with the principles governing such matters. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed with costs.

The Supreme Court's final order was that the appeal was dismissed and that the appellant, Howley, was to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision underscored the importance of adhering to the principle that costs generally follow the event and highlighted the limited circumstances under which this rule might be departed from.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.