Hore-Lacy v Cleary

In the matter of Hore-Lacy v Cleary, the plaintiff, Hore-Lacy, sought damages for defamation against the defendant, Cleary. The crux of the dispute was the publication by Cleary of statements that were alleged to be defamatory. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff claimed that statements made by the defendant in a book he authored were defamatory, while the defendant argued that the statements were fair comments made in good faith.

The legal issues central to the case involved the pleading of fair comment as a defence to defamation. The court had to determine whether it was necessary for the defendant to address the sting of the libel as pleaded by the plaintiff. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the alleged fair comment effectively met the sting of the libel as pleaded by the plaintiff. Another issue was whether particulars could be ordered of the facts upon which the alleged comment was founded, especially when the defence of fair comment was of the ‘rolled-up’ kind. The case of Aga Khan v Times Publishing Co [1924] 1 KB 675 was considered to be pertinent to these issues.

The Supreme Court found that the defendant did not need to address the sting of the libel as pleaded by the plaintiff, as long as the sting of the libel was reasonably ascertainable from the words used. The court also held that the alleged fair comment did meet the sting of the libel as pleaded. Regarding the order for particulars, the court ruled that such an order could be made when the fair comment defence was of the ‘rolled-up’ kind, meaning that the comment was so intertwined with the facts that it was not possible to separate the comment from the facts. The court thus allowed the plaintiff to obtain particulars of the facts upon which the alleged comment was founded.

The final orders of the court included the allowance of particulars to be sought by the plaintiff and the dismissal of the defendant's plea on the ground that the fair comment defence was of the ‘rolled-up’ kind. This ruling provided clarity on the pleading of fair comment in defamation cases and the circumstances under which particulars of facts may be ordered.