Holst and Blakeslee and Anor

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was asked to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear a breach of contract claim brought by the Applicant Mother against School A, and whether it should grant injunctive relief. The dispute arose after School A terminated the enrollment contract for the parties' child, citing the father's alleged breach of the school's Parent Code of Conduct. The Mother sought to have the child re-enrolled, and the school had initially indicated it would reconsider if the Mother obtained sole parental responsibility and an injunction under the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth), but later reneged on this representation.

The legal issues before the Court included whether it possessed accrued jurisdiction to hear the contractual claim alongside the family law matters, whether it was appropriate to exercise such jurisdiction, and whether the Court had jurisdiction under section 14 of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth) to grant the requested remedies. The Mother also argued for the joinder of School A as a necessary party under rule 11.01 of the *Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001* (Cth) and contended that School A had breached the enrollment contract by failing to engage in a dispute resolution process before termination. Finally, the Court was asked to consider whether it should exercise its discretion to grant a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the reinstatement of the child's enrolment, applying the principles established in *Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd* (1968) 118 CLR 618.

Judge Neville dismissed the Applicant Mother's application. The Court found that the Mother's claim for injunctive relief against School A was a breach of contract claim, which was not a matter within the federal jurisdiction of the Court. While the Court acknowledged the principles of accrued jurisdiction and the potential for a single justiciable controversy, it determined that the contractual claim was not sufficiently connected to the family law matters to be considered part of the same controversy. Furthermore, the Court found that section 14 of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth) did not confer jurisdiction to grant the specific equitable relief sought in this context. Consequently, the Court ordered that the Applicant's application be dismissed, with each party to bear their own costs, and all extant applications were dismissed, finalising the matter.