Hogarth v The Queen

[1965] HCA 43

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

HOGARTH v. THE QUEEN

(1965) 114 CLR 48

12 August 1965

Criminal Law

Criminal Law—Setting man-traps—Gun set on private property—No intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm—Likely to cause such result by place and manner of setting—The Criminal Code (Q.), s. 327*.

Decisions

August 12.
The following written judgments were delivered : -
BARWICK C.J. The applicant for special leave was convicted on an indictment under s. 327 of The Criminal Code of Queensland for that he " . . . set a spring-gun, namely a shot-gun operated by a trip-wire, in such a place and in such a manner that it was likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it . . . " and was sentenced to twelve months' hard labour, such sentence to be suspended under the provisions of s. 656 of The Criminal Code upon his entering into a recognisance for 100 pounds for good behaviour for twelve months. (at p50)

2. From this conviction he appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Criminal Appeal, that Court holding itself bound to follow the interpretation placed upon the relevant portion of s. 327 by the same Court in Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 . It is from this decision that the applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court. (at p50)

3. Section 327 is in the following terms : "Any person who sets or places any spring-gun, man-trap, or other engine calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm, or causes any such things to be set or placed, in any place with the intent that it may kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact with it, or sets or places any such thing in any such place and in any such manner that it is likely to cause any such result, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for three years. (at p51)

4. "Any person who knowingly permits any such spring-gun, man-trap, or other engine, which has been set or placed by another person in any such place and in any such manner that it is likely to cause any such result, to continue so set or placed in any place which is then in, or afterwards comes into, his possession or occupation, is deemed to have set and placed the gun, trap, or engine, with the intent aforesaid. (at p51)

5. "This section does not make it unlawful to set any gin or trap such as is usually set for the purpose of destroying vermin ; or to set any spring-gun, man-trap, or engine, at night in a dwelling-house for the protection of the dwelling-house." (at p51)

6. As part of his endeavour to eradicate dingoes on his property, the appellant set a spring-gun in a part of his property over which he claimed people were unlikely to pass. In the event a forest ranger employed by the Queensland Forestry Department unexpectedly drove his jeep into that portion of the property in order, for the purposes of the Department, to examine some of the timber growing there. Whilst walking in the course of that inspection, he came in contact with the spring-gun and was wounded, his right leg subsequently being amputated. (at p51)

7. The question which arises is as to the proper construction of the abovementioned section. (at p51)

8. In my opinion, it is convenient for present purposes to consider the first paragraph of the section as falling into two distinct parts. (at p51)

9. The section is evidently drawn upon a realisation that a spring-gun may be so set that, either because of the place in which it is set, or because of the manner of its setting, it will not injure anybody at all, or injure only those who come into contact with it or injure only persons who do not come in contact with it. It may be, of course, that in the ordinary course of events the persons most likely to be killed or injured by the spring-gun will be those who by contact with it cause it to discharge. But however that may be, the legislature has evidently been content by this section to protect only those who come into contact with the gun. (at p51)

10. The first branch of the first paragraph requires in respect of spring-guns that the person who sets or places a spring-gun or causes it to be set or placed must have an actual intention thereby to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or any person coming in contact with it. The words italicized thus operate to limit the class of persons whom it is an offence to intend to kill or injure by the setting and placing of a spring-gun : the class consists of those who come in contact with the spring-gun. Consequently, it is not an offence to set or place a spring-gun with the intention of injuring a trespasser or other person who does not come into contact with it ; for example, it is not an offence if the gun is so placed or set that whilst it is triggered by A it is aimed in the direction of B or where B might be expected to be at the actual time with intent to injure B. On this branch of the first paragraph it is the actual intent of killing or injuring this limited class of people which is the inculpating circumstance. The unlikelihood that that intention will be effective is immaterial. But of course the intention may be inferred from circumstances, which may include the place where and the manner in which the spring-gun is set : clearly that intention could not be so inferred if the gun was set in a place to which people were unlikely to resort, although the gun was set in such a manner that if perchance anybody came into contact with it he would be in jeopardy. (at p52)

11. The second branch of the first paragraph deals, it seems to me, with a situation in which it cannot be found that an actual intention to kill or injure was present in the placing and setting of the gun, but the circumstances of its placement and of its setting are such that lethal or injurious consequences should have been anticipated by the person placing and setting it. It is because death or injury is likely to be caused to the same limited class of persons that the person so placing or setting the spring-gun is inculpated. If the place is one to which people are unlikely to resort, or if the manner of setting the gun, either in absolute terms or relatively to the nature and circumstance of the place in which the gun is set, is such that it is unlikely to kill or injure any person or persons in the limited class, then no anticipation or expectation of such lethal or injurious consequence ought to be attributed to the persons so placing or setting the gun ; and no offence will have been committed. (at p52)

12. The correlation between the two branches of the section, to my mind, is in these differing modes of inculpation, on the one hand actual intent and, on the other, imputed anticipation - in each case of lethal or injurious consequence to persons in the restricted class, those who come into contact with the spring-gun. Because of the specific quality of the intent in the first instance, it is sufficient to speak of setting or placing with that intent in any place : whereas, where the criminality is to be derived from what ought to have been anticipated as likely to result, the circumstance and the place where the spring-gun is set as well as the manner of setting it is an indispensable element. (at p53)

13. The contrary view is that the relevant likelihood in the second branch of the paragraph is the likelihood that a person who actually comes into contact with the spring-gun will be injured. It is derived from the words "any such result" by reading the words "coming into contact with it" as part of the description of that result. But, in my opinion, these words describe the persons in respect of whom the result is relevant or significant. The result is death or injury. It is the likelihood of this result, death or injury, befalling people in the limited class of persons which is the criterion of liability. It is the likelihood of death or injury resulting from the place where and the manner in which the spring-gun is placed or set. Such a result is not likely if the spring-gun, however set, is set in a place whence persons cannot, or are unlikely to, come. It may be that in the application of this provision a low threshold of likelihood should be adopted, bearing in mind the consequences of the release of the spring-gun. But that is a vastly different thing from reading the provision as meaning that the spring-gun may only be set in any case, however impossible or unlikely it is that persons will resort to the place where it is set, if it is set in a manner which, though it may injure others, is unlikely to injure persons who happen to trip it off. Such a meaning must, certainly for all practical purposes and perhaps in all theoretical circumstances, elide the words "in any such place" from this branch of the paragraph or treat the expressions "in any such place" and "in any such manner" disjunctively notwithstanding their express conjunction in the section. Indeed, I cannot find a reading of the section which respects the conjunction of "in any such place and in any such manner", which does not require that the likelihood of lethal or injurious consequence be inherent in the place where the gun is set, if it be there set in a manner which makes it capable of producing such a consequence. Perhaps consideration of the case of a man-trap brings out these considerations more clearly. (at p53)

14. Some discussion took place in Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 and has taken place in the argument of this appeal as to whether or not the legislature in this section intended to impose an absolute prohibition on the use of spring-guns. But, whichever of the currently conflicting views of the section is selected, the prohibition is not absolute. The very limitation of the class of persons sought to be protected by the section indicates that an absolute prohibition is not intended. If the legislature had wished to impose such a prohibition, the form of it would have been so simple. Whilst I find the endeavour to derive assistance in the construction of the section from its antecedents unrewarding, it is noticeable that the concept of "likelihood" was introduced into the section in the course of its development, a step which, in my opinion, clearly tends against the view that the section imposes an absolute prohibition. (at p54)

15. The learned trial judge in the case under appeal, being bound to follow the decision in Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 , directed the jury in terms that they were to disregard the evidence which dealt with the likelihood of anyone coming in contact with the spring-gun and directed them that the likelihood with which they were concerned was the likelihood of anyone, once having come in contact with the spring-gun, being thereby killed or suffering grievous bodily harm. In my opinion, the learned trial judge was correct in indicating that the offence would only be made out if a spring-gun was set in such a manner that it would be likely to kill or injure any person who came in contact with it. But, in my opinion, Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 was not well decided and ought to be overruled. Consequently, his Honour's direction as to the relevance of evidence as to the likelihood of persons resorting to the place where the spring-gun was set was erroneous. In my opinion, s. 327 does not make it an offence to set a spring-gun, without the relevant intent to kill or injure, in a place to which persons are unlikely to resort, or in a place where because of its characteristics or circumstances, persons are unliekly to come into contact with the spring-gun, even if the spring-gun is set so that whoever in the unlikely event trips it in that place is likely to be killed or injured. (at p54)

16. For these reasons I would grant special leave to appeal, allow the appeal and remit the matter to the Supreme Court for a new trial. (at p54)

KITTO J. The applicant was convicted upon an indictment charging him, under s. 327 of The Criminal Code of Queensland, with having set a spring-gun, namely a shot-gun operated by a trip wire, in such a place and in such a manner that it was likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it. An indictment in these terms is provided for by form No. 199 in the Schedule to The Criminal Practice Rules of 1900 authorized by s. 707 of the Code. The relevant portion of s. 327, contained in the first of three paragraphs, is in these terms : - "Any person who sets or places any spring-gun, man-trap, or other engine calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous obdily harm, or causes any such thing to be set or placed, in any place with the intent that it may kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact with it, or sets or places any such thing in any such place and in any such manner that it is likely to cause any such result, is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for three years." (at p55)

2. The learned trial judge directed the jury, in accordance with the construction which had been placed upon this provision by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Reg. v. Williams (1), that the question to be decided by them in relation to the place and manner of the setting of the spring-gun was whether the gun was set in such a place and in such a manner that it was likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it. In other words, as his Honour proceeded to make clear, his direction was that the likelihood of someone's coming into contact with the gun was irrelevant : the question was whether, if a person did come into contact with the gun, the place and manner of the setting made it likely that that person would be killed or would receive grievous bodily harm. (at p55)

3. An appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal failed, the Court holding that it should follow Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 . The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal in order to test the correctness of the construction placed upon the first paragraph of s. 327 in that case. (at p55)

4. In my opinion the construction is correct. Two classes of cases are dealt with. The first is that in which there is an intent that the gun (etc.) may kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon "a trespasser or other person coming in contact with it". The second is that in which there is not that intent but the place and manner of the setting or placing of the gun (etc.) are such that the gun (etc.) is likely to cause "any such result". The kind of result referred to seems to me clearly to be that to which, under the first limb of the provision, the intent relates, namely the killing or inflicting of grievous bodily harm upon "a trespasser or other person coming into contact with it". In Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 Stanley J. expressed succinctly and exactly what seems to me to be the parallelism between the two limbs. He said : "If one has the wrongful intent, it does not matter if he chooses a place or manner that would defeat the intent; if one has not the intent, he is not liable unless he chooses a place and manner of use which make the unintended result likely" (1958) Qd R, at p 193 . That which is intended in the one case and that which is made likely by the place and manner of the setting or placing in the other must surely be the same thing, namely death or grievous bodily harm to a person coming in contact with the gun. The argument to the contrary is that the word "such" in "any such result" refers back to the expression "to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm". But those words occur in the section, not as the description of results intended to be caused by the setting or placing of a spring-gun (etc.), but merely as part of the description of that class of spring-gun (etc.) to the setting or placing of which the section applies. The effect, as it seems to me, is that, given a spring-gun (etc.) calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm, it is an offence to set it or place it either with intent to produce one of the stated results or in such a place or manner that one of those results is likely to be caused. In each case the results are results to a trespasser or other person coming in contact with the gun (etc.). (at p56)

5. It is said that if this be so the words "in any such place" perform no function : the likelihood of death or grievous bodily harm might as well have been made to depend only on the manner in which the gun (etc.) is set or placed. But this is not correct. On the hypothesis that a person comes in contact with the gun (etc.), the physical characteristics of the place, particularly the absence of intervening trees, boulders or other obstructions, must affect the likelihood of that person's being killed or harmed no less than the manner in which the spring-gun (etc.) is set or placed. It is for that reason, no doubt, that the first limb says "in any place", while the second makes the selection of the place as much of the essence of the offence as the selection of the manner. Whether the place is such that no trespasser or other person is likely to come in contact with the gun (etc.) is therefore, in my opinion, immaterial. (at p56)

6. I would refuse special leave to appeal. (at p56)

TAYLOR J. In my view Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 was correctly decided and I am, therefore, of opinion that special leave to appeal should be refused. I agree entirely with the observations of Kitto J. and I have nothing to add. (at p56)

MENZIES J. Section 327 of The Criminal Code (Q.) makes it an offence to set or place a spring-gun, man-trap or other dangerous engine under two sets of conditions. On the one hand, if the device is set or placed with the intention of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm on a trespasser or other person coming into contact with the device, an offence is made out. On the other hand, even if there be no such intent to kill or grievously wound, etc. the section makes it an offence to "set or place any such thing in any such place and in any such manner that is likely to cause any such result". (at p57)

2. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland has construed "any such result" to mean "kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming into contact with it", with the result that it is irrelevant to ask whether, because the gun is set at a particular place, injury is likely to be caused, although one must enquire whether the manner of setting is of itself likely to cause injury to a particular person. In other words, thus read, the section contemplates that the proper course of enquiry is to assume that a person comes into contact with the device and ask, is injury likely to follow? Any enquiry as to the likelihood of such contact becomes irrelevant. It may still be relevant, however, on this approach to ask whether the place per se is such as to make injury probable or improbable once there has been contact. (at p57)

3. For the appellant, it has been argued that "sets in any such place . . . likely to cause any such result" involves an enquiry whether it is likely that any person will resort to that place. If not, then it cannot be likely that anyone will be killed or injured by it because a priori no one can be expected to come there to be injured. And this is so notwithstanding that, if any person did come into contact with the device, he would in all probability be injured. (at p57)

4. The problem of construction which confronts us, therefore, is to be solved by determining the meaning to be given to the words "any such result" where they appear in s. 327. These words may refer (1) to causing death or grievous bodily harm simpliciter, or (2) to causing death or grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with the engine set or placed. In my opinion the first alternative is to be preferred, with the consequence that, in the absence of the intent described in the section, there is no offence unless death or grievous bodily harm is likely to result to some person from the setting of the spring-gun, etc. in respect of which the charge is laid. (at p57)

5. The section is only concerned with the setting of engines calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm - including spring-guns and man-traps. It provides, in the first place, that where an engine of such a description is set with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it, a misdemeanour is thereby committed. The section then deals with what seems to me to be an entirely different set of circumstances, viz. where there is no such intention but the spring-gun, etc. is set so that it is likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person. This culpable conduct is also made a misdemeanour. (at p58)

6. It appears to me that a man-trap, for instance, which by description is calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm when sprung, would always, when set, answer the description of something likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it wherever it might be set or placed. If the intention had been merely to forbid absolutely the setting of such a man-trap, this could have been achieved by a very simple provision. However, under the somewhat elaborate provisions of s. 327, the setting of a man-trap without the intention of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it, is an offence only when, by reason of both the place and manner of setting, death or grievous bodily harm to some person is likely to ensue. If it be set in a place to which it is unlikely that any person will resort, then the setting is not an offence notwithstanding that it is set in a manner likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person who happens to come in contact with it. What is true of a man-trap is true of the other engines to which the section relates. (at p58)

7. I regard the word "likely" as relating more appropriately to the probability of death or grievous bodily harm actually resulting from the place and manner of the setting of the spring-gun, etc. than to the probability of a spring-gun, etc. killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it. The latter cannot, so far as I can see, be said to depend to any real extent upon the place where the engine is set. A man-trap, for instance, set far from the haunts of man is still as likely to harm a person coming in contact with it as a like man-trap set in a busy thoroughfare. Similarly, it would matter not at all whether it was set in an open space or in the midst of rocks and trees, for he who touches it, wherever it be set, is in deadly danger. To my mind, to disregard the place of the setting, except to the extent to which it may possibly contribute to the likelihood of harm to the person touching it, would be to disregard something to which the section attaches critical significance. (at p58)

8. Furthermore, the construction that commends itself to me is one which has the merit of relating criminality to culpability. A man who sets a spring-gun to destroy vermin in a place where there is no likelihood of any person coming in contact with it and suffering harm thereby is much less blameworthy than one who sets such a gun in a place where it is likely that it will be set off so as to kill or injure somebody. (at p59)

9. It is true that the construction I have adopted means that the elements of the offence which is created when there is an intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with the spring-gun or other dangerous engine differ substantially from the elements of the offence created in the absence of such an intention, but such a difference is not only understandable - it seems to me inevitable - and I see no reason for construing the section so that two courses of conduct, which are essentially different, will be brought into line with one another. (at p59)

10. It is for the foregoing reasons that I have come to the conclusion that to set a spring-gun, etc. without any intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a person coming in contact with it is not an offence unless it is set both in a place and in a manner so as to be likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to some person. (at p59)

11. In my opinion, special leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed. (at p59)

WINDEYER J. This case turns upon the proper construction of the somewhat involved language of s. 327 of The Criminal Code (Q.). The resolution of the question is somewhat aided by contrasting the language of the section with that of the earlier enactment on the topic, s. 28 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1865 (Q.), 29 Vic. No. 11, corresponding to s. 31 of the English Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. This was the course followed by the Supreme Court in Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 . The history there related by Stanley J. is interesting and it shows that Sir Samuel Griffith apparently thought the provision in the Code did not alter the law. But it is not permissible, it seems to me, to construe the enactment by its eminent draftsman's views of it, which at best can be only reassuring. We may, of course, look at the earlier statute law and at the common law before the first legislation against man-traps and spring-guns was enacted in England in 1817 as a result of the controversy following the decision in Llott v. Wilkes (1820) 3 B &Ald 304 (106 ER 674) : see Holdsworth, History of English Law vol. 13, pp. 267, 390, 526, 548. But, after all, the meaning and effect of s. 327 must be ascertained from a consideration of its language. (at p59)

2. The enactment is concerned with "spring-guns, man-traps or other engines calculated to destroy human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm". Their use is subject to prohibitions and restrictions. As I read it, s. 327 creates two forms of misdemeanour. One consists in setting or placing an instrument of the kind described, or causing such an instrument to be set or placed, in any place with intent that it may kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact with it. The other is setting or placing the instrument "in any such place and in any such manner that it is likely to cause any such result". I read "likely to cause any such result" as referring to the aforesaid results, that is as meaning likely to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact with the instrument. The charge on which the appellant was indicted was framed on the assumption that that is the meaning - and I think rightly so. (at p60)

3. The first part of the section thus makes it an offence to use a spring-gun with intent to cause the stated result, death or grievous bodily harm to a person coming in contact with it. Whether it was so set that it was in fact likely to go off on contact and likely if it did so to cause that result is in that case immaterial. A person setting a spring-gun with intent to do grievous bodily harm cannot excuse himself by saying that in fact he set it in such a faulty manner that he must have failed in his purpose. (at p60)

4. The offence created by the second part of the section consists in so using an instrument of the kind described that it is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a person coming in contact with it. Whether there was any intent to cause that result is in that case immaterial. It is not without significance that at one time it was said that a man could set spring-guns on his property and post notices of their being there merely as a deterrent to trespassers without, it was said, intending to do harm. For example, Lord Tenterden, then Abbott C.J., said in Ilott v. Wilkes (1820) 3 B &Ald 304, at p 309 (106 ER 674, at p 676) : "I believe that many persons who cause engines of this description to be placed in their grounds do not do so with the intention of injuring anyone, but really believe that the notices they give of such engines being there will prevent any injury occurring . . .". And Bayley J. in the same case said: "Such instruments may be undoubtedly placed without any intention of doing injury, and for the mere purpose of protecting property by means of terror" (1820) 3 B &Ald, at p 310 (106 ER, at p 677) . But that proposition, if it was correct, was not tenable as a defence to a charge under the Act 7 &8 Geo. IV, c. 18. The recital to the Act made it clear that its purpose was to prohibit, subject only to permitted exceptions, the setting of spring-guns and man-traps dangerous to life or limb. It did so by its use of the words "with the intent that or whereby the same may destroy or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person". This Act was part of the law inherited in New South Wales by virtue of 9 Geo. IV, c. 83, s. 24. And, being there still unrepealed in 1859, it continued in force in Queensland after its separation from New South Wales. But the statute law in the two colonies took different courses after the enactment in England of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, s. 31. This Act, which replaced 7 &8 Geo. IV, c. 18, was copied by Queensland in 1865. In New South Wales it was not copied and the Act of 1817 remained in force there until 1883 when, by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, it was repealed and s. 34 of that Act enacted in its place. That section, now s. 49 of the Crimes Act, 1900, is a distinct departure in that it makes an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm an essential ingredient of the offence. (at p61)

5. The appellant's argument is that the Queensland Act upon its true construction does not make the setting of a spring-gun without intent to cause grievous bodily harm an offence unless it be likely that, by reason of the place and manner in which it is set, someone will come upon it and be hurt. It was said that the words in s. 327, "sets or places any such thing in any such place and in any such manner that it is likely to cause any such result", refer to the likelihood of some person being killed or grievously harmed and that there could be no such likelihood if the instrument were set in a place to which it was unlikely that anyone would come. A provision to that effect might not seem unreasonable, especially in Queensland, as it would enable the careful use of spring-guns to kill dingoes. But to treat this enactment as having that effect seems to me to truncate the meaning of the expression "such result" ; for, as I have said, it seems to me that those words must refer to causing death or grievous bodily harm to a person coming in contact with the instrument. The words "in any such manner and in any such place" refer, I think, to the manner in which the instrument is set (that is, set so that it will go off upon contact), and to the place where it is put (that is, where it will injure a person who comes in contact with any part of it). The words thus describe an arrangement of the instrument having regard to both its setting and its siting. It is to be remembered that it is not an offence to set a spring-gun for the purpose of frightening an intruder or giving an alarm, provided that it is of such a character or is so arranged that it is not likely when it goes off to do more than that : see Wootton v. Dawkins (1857) 2 CB (NS) 412 (140 ER 477) . If, for example, the gun be loaded with a blank cartridge or be so sited that it discharges into the air or into a pit or not in the direction of its trip wire, there is no offence. Nor is it an offence to set an instrument that may cause some hurt - for example one which gives an electric shock - provided it is not likely to do, and is not intended to do, grievous bodily harm. It may be that the words "in any such manner" would, if not accompanied by the words "in any such place" have sufficed to comprehend all that the composite phrase does. But I do not think that when the enactment is read as a whole the mere addition of the words "in any such place" has the effect of making the offence depend upon the liklihood of someone coming to that place. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Reg. v. Williams (1958) Qd R 185 and in this case were, I consider, correct. In my opinion leave to appeal should be refused. (at p62)

Orders

Special leave to appeal refused.