Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen

In *Hili v The Queen* and *Jones v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered appeals against convictions for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained through alleged breaches of the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979* (Cth) and the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth), specifically relating to the use of listening devices and the detention of the appellants. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the evidence, obtained in circumstances that may have contravened statutory provisions, should have been excluded by the trial judge.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances where there may have been a contravention of statutory provisions governing the use of listening devices and the detention of suspects. This involved considering the scope of the exclusionary discretion of a trial judge, particularly in relation to evidence obtained in breach of statutory obligations, and the principles governing the admission of such evidence under Australian law.

Gummow J, in his reasons, focused on the principles of judicial discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. His Honour affirmed that a trial judge possesses a discretion to exclude evidence, even if lawfully obtained, if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. However, where evidence is obtained in contravention of statutory provisions, the question is not simply one of balancing probative value against prejudice. Instead, the court must consider the nature of the contravention, the purpose of the statutory provision, and the impact of admitting the evidence on the fairness of the trial. His Honour indicated that the admission of evidence obtained in breach of statutory requirements does not automatically render a trial unfair, but the circumstances of the breach are a critical factor in the exercise of discretion.