HIGGINS & MORUBA

In the matter of HIGGINS & MORUBA, the dispute before Thornton J concerned a financial agreement executed by the husband and wife pursuant to section 90B of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) the day before their marriage. The parties disagreed on who should be the applicant for a threshold hearing concerning the validity of this agreement.

The court was required to determine several procedural and substantive issues. These included whether the wife should be designated the applicant for the hearing to set aside the financial agreement, and whether the wife was entitled to full discovery akin to that sought in an application under section 79 of the Act. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the wife's application to set aside the financial agreement should be heard concurrently with her application for property settlement and other financial orders, or if these issues should remain bifurcated.

Thornton J reasoned that the wife would be deemed the applicant for the purpose of the hearing concerning the setting aside of the financial agreement. The court declined to make an order for full and frank disclosure at that stage, and determined that the issues should remain bifurcated, meaning the application to set aside the financial agreement would be heard separately from the property settlement and other financial orders.

Consequently, the court ordered that paragraphs 2 and 6 of the wife’s Amended Response to an Application in a Case filed 9 April 2018 be withdrawn, and that this Amended Response be dismissed. The wife was deemed the applicant for the hearing of her application to set aside the financial agreement. The husband’s Application in a Case filed 30 January 2017 was otherwise dismissed, and the matter was to be placed on the list of cases awaiting allocation to a judicial docket with priority from the date of the order.