Hendy v Rider

The case of *Hendy v Rider* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The informant, Rider, had laid an information against the appellant, Hendy, alleging that Hendy carried on the business of a marine store without the written consent of the Council of the City of Prahran, contrary to section 286 of the *Health Act 1915* (Vic.). Evidence was presented that Hendy dealt in bottles and old metals, purchased from collectors, and held a licence as a dealer in special wares under the *Marine Stores and Old Metals Act 1915*. The premises were described as clean, and a notice indicated that only bottles and metals were bought. The magistrates dismissed the information, but on review, the Supreme Court of Victoria, by Irvine C.J., made the order absolute, remitting the case for rehearing with the opinion that the business was one ordinarily carried on in a marine store and thus covered by section 286, irrespective of whether it was offensive.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the business of dealing in bottles and old metals, as conducted by the appellant, constituted a business "usually carried on in or connected with marine stores" within the meaning of section 286 of the *Health Act 1915*, and whether the section applied to such businesses regardless of whether they were actually offensive. The appellant argued that section 286 should be interpreted as applying only to businesses that were in fact offensive, given its placement within the "Offensive Trades" division of the Act, and that the Supreme Court should not have interfered with the magistrates' finding that the business was not usually carried on at marine stores.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the facts established that the appellant carried on a business of dealing in bottles and old metals, which was a business usually carried on in or connected with establishments called marine stores. The Court found it unnecessary to definitively define "marine store" for the purposes of the case. It was sufficient that the business fell within the scope of section 286, which required council consent for such establishments, irrespective of whether the specific operation was offensive. The Court affirmed that the appellant's business, conducted without the necessary consent, constituted a breach of the Act, and the Supreme Court's order to review was rightly made absolute.