HARVEY & HARVEY
Case
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[2020] FamCA 1101
Details
AGLC
Case
Decision Date
HARVEY & HARVEY [2020] FamCA 1101
[2020] FamCA 1101
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Harvey & Harvey* [2020] FamCA 1101, the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the father, Mr Harvey, to vary existing final parenting orders. The father sought to re-open proceedings and obtain sole parental responsibility for one of the children, F, along with specific time and communication arrangements. These orders were sought against the mother, Ms Harvey, who was the respondent.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the father had established a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify disturbing the previous final parenting orders, which had been made by consent. The court was required to apply the principles established in *Rice & Asplund* (1979) FLC 90-725, which dictate that an application to reverse an earlier parenting order should not be lightly entertained and requires the applicant to demonstrate a changed circumstance or a new factor that would justify such a significant step.
Justice McEvoy found that the father had failed to establish the necessary material change in circumstances. While acknowledging the father's concerns regarding access to online school resources and his desire to provide remote learning, the court considered these insufficient to warrant setting aside the September 2019 consent orders. The court noted that the father's use of available collaboration software had involved bombarding the mother with allegations concerning her exercise of sole parental responsibility, which did not support his application.
Consequently, the court dismissed all extant applications made by the father. It further ordered that any future applications made by either party must first be listed before the Senior Registrar for consideration.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the father had established a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify disturbing the previous final parenting orders, which had been made by consent. The court was required to apply the principles established in *Rice & Asplund* (1979) FLC 90-725, which dictate that an application to reverse an earlier parenting order should not be lightly entertained and requires the applicant to demonstrate a changed circumstance or a new factor that would justify such a significant step.
Justice McEvoy found that the father had failed to establish the necessary material change in circumstances. While acknowledging the father's concerns regarding access to online school resources and his desire to provide remote learning, the court considered these insufficient to warrant setting aside the September 2019 consent orders. The court noted that the father's use of available collaboration software had involved bombarding the mother with allegations concerning her exercise of sole parental responsibility, which did not support his application.
Consequently, the court dismissed all extant applications made by the father. It further ordered that any future applications made by either party must first be listed before the Senior Registrar for consideration.
Details
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Consent
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Procedural Fairness
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Remedies
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Standing
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Statutory Construction
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Citations
HARVEY & HARVEY [2020] FamCA 1101
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