Hamersley v Newton

In the case of Hamersley v Newton, the dispute centred around the interpretation of a will, specifically the administration of real property and the application of the rule in Shelley's case. The court was tasked with determining the nature of various interests created by the will, including whether they were vested or contingent, and whether the interests of remaindermen were accelerated upon the surrender of a prior life estate. This determination was crucial in identifying the persons entitled to the property under the will.

The primary legal issues were whether the revocation of a life interest in a share of a fund granted to the testator's daughter, with a remainder to her children, resulted in the acceleration of the remainder interest in favour of the grandchildren, or if it instead left that interest postponed for the duration of the daughter's life. The court also had to consider the effect of the rule in Shelley's case on the distribution of the property, and whether the interests were subject to divestment.

The court concluded that the revocation of the life interest in the daughter's share did not revoke the gift in remainder to her children. The critical issue was whether the determination of the life interest in favour of the daughter accelerated the interest of her children and grandchildren or left it postponed. The majority of the court held that the remainder interest in favour of the grandchildren had become accelerated. The court reasoned that the limitation of the corpus of the trust fund, introduced by the words "and immediately after the deceased if any one of my sons or daughters," denoted the order of succession and created an interest expectant upon the determination of the prior interest by any means.

The court's decision was based on the principle that the destruction of a life interest does not cause an intestacy unless it is clear that the interest limited in succession to the life interest was to take effect only upon the specified event of the death of the life tenant and was not to fall into possession on the sooner determination of the life interest. The majority found that the terms of the will were consistent with an intention to distribute at a moment which may be anterior to the birth of all the members of the class.