Haddad v The GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd

The appellant, Mr Haddad, brought a claim for workers' compensation against the respondent, The GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the deemed date of injury for a disease contracted by a gradual process, and whether this date was determinative of his entitlement to compensation. Mr Haddad's original claim sought both weekly payments for incapacity under section 33 of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) and medical treatment expenses under section 60 of the same Act. However, the claim for weekly payments was subsequently withdrawn.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the deeming provisions in section 15(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) were engaged by the appellant's circumstances. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the operation of these provisions, which deem the date of injury for a disease contracted by a gradual process, depended on the existence of an incapacity for work and a consequential entitlement to claim compensation for economic loss. Furthermore, the Court considered whether the limitation period stipulated in section 261 of the *Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998* (NSW) was inapplicable due to the appellant's abandonment of his claim for weekly payments.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that section 15 of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) operates to deem the date of injury for a disease contracted by a gradual process. It held that the deeming provisions in section 15(1)(a)(i) and (ii) are engaged when a claim is made for compensation for the injury, and that the entitlement to compensation for economic loss, which arises from incapacity, is not a prerequisite for the deeming provisions to apply. The Court found that the appellant's claim for medical expenses under section 60 constituted a claim for compensation for the injury, thereby triggering the deeming provisions of section 15. Consequently, the Court determined that the limitation period under section 261 was not a bar to the appellant's claim for medical expenses, as the deeming of the injury date under section 15 was operative.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondent.