Gumley v Breen

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicant, Charles Gumley, was the informant in proceedings against the respondent, James Breen, who had been charged with using insulting words in a public street contrary to section 6 of the *Police Offences (Amendment) Act 1908* (N.S.W.). The alleged insulting words were a statement made at an anti-conscription meeting in a public street, attended by two to three hundred people, asserting that thirty thousand British women were behind the firing line in France, performing servile work and acting as concubines to British officers.

The legal issue before the High Court was whether the statement made by Mr. Breen constituted "insulting words" within the meaning of section 6 of the *Police Offences (Amendment) Act 1908*. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the words needed to be directed at individuals present or refer to persons closely associated with them, or if the provision extended to words that might be considered insulting to a broader group or to the general public, even if not personally addressed. The Supreme Court had held that the words were not "insulting" as they did not refer to the character of individuals present or those closely associated with them, and thus did not violate public order by hurting personal feelings.

The High Court refused special leave to appeal. The court implicitly accepted the reasoning of the Supreme Court that the offence under section 6 was directed at language calculated to hurt the personal feelings of individuals, whether addressed to them directly or used in their hearing, and whether concerning their own character or that of those closely associated with them. The applicant argued that the provision was intended to maintain public order and prevent disorder, and that the words used were a direct insult to any British subject present. However, the High Court found no sufficient reason to grant special leave to appeal, indicating a lack of arguable error in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of "insulting words" under the Act.