GU v TO

The appellant, GU, brought an appeal against the respondent, TO, in relation to a sexual abuse case. The appellant alleged that the respondent, a church curate, sexually abused him between 1974 and 1976 when he was between 14 and 16 years of age. The appellant's now deceased mother had informed the church rector of the abuse in 2004, but the rector denies that the appellant's mother told him of the abuse. The appellant claims the church failed in its duty to take steps to stop the abuse once it knew of the situation. The appellant applied under s 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to obtain leave to bring an action despite noncompliance with the Act. If leave is obtained under s 43, the appellant still needs to obtain an extension of time under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The appellant argued that the judge erred in refusing leave on the basis that he did not have a reasonably arguable case for an extension of time.
The court was required to determine whether the judge erred in refusing leave to the appellant on the basis that he did not have a reasonably arguable case for an extension of time. The court also needed to decide whether if leave was granted by the Court of Appeal, the orders could be made nunc pro tunc. The court considered the evidence presented by the appellant and found that there was a reasonably arguable case for an extension of time. The court found that the appellant had established that the church failed in its duty to take steps to stop the abuse once it knew of the situation, and that the appellant's mother had informed the church rector of the abuse in 2004. The court also found that the orders could be made nunc pro tunc if leave was granted by the Court of Appeal.
The court allowed the appeal and granted the appellant leave pursuant to s 18, s 43, and s 59(2)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to proceed further with his claim against the respondent despite noncompliance with Part 1 of Chapter 2 of that Act. The court declared that such proceedings would have effect between these parties and for the purposes of that Act as if started no later than 7 May 2005. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.