Green v Titmus

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The dispute originated in the Licensing Court of Tasmania, where an application by George Marshall Titmus for the approval to sell liquor in a different house was objected to by a group of ratepayers, including Henry H. Green. The Licensing Court, finding the objection petition valid, refused the application. Titmus then obtained a special case stated to the Supreme Court, which was heard by Crisp J. during vacation. Crisp J. answered the question posed in the special case in the negative and remitted the matter to the Licensing Court. The petitioners appealed this decision to the Full Court of Tasmania, but the Full Court, by majority, held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of a single Judge of that Court, sitting in vacation, upon a special case stated under the Licensing Act 1902 (Tas.). Specifically, the High Court had to determine the interplay between section 89 of the Licensing Act 1902, which stated that orders made by the Supreme Court on a special case were final and conclusive, and sections 2 and 3 of the Supreme Court Act 1917 (Tas.), which provided for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by a single Judge and for appeals from such decisions.

The High Court reasoned that the Supreme Court Act 1917, particularly section 2 with its preface "notwithstanding any law to the contrary," was intended to be a comprehensive and overriding piece of legislation concerning the administration of justice in the Supreme Court. It established that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, in every aspect, could be exercised by a single Judge. Section 3 of the same Act then provided a complementary right of appeal to the Full Court from any decision of a single Judge exercising the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The Court found that the functions and jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court on a special case stated under the Licensing Act were of a strictly judicial nature, thus falling within the ambit of the Supreme Court Act 1917. Consequently, the presumption that a general statute does not override a special statute was displaced by the express wording of section 2 of the Supreme Court Act 1917.

The High Court allowed the appeal from the Full Court of Tasmania. It ordered that the Full Court's decision, which held it lacked jurisdiction, be discharged. The appeal from Crisp J. was remitted to the Full Court for hearing and determination. The special leave to appeal from Crisp J.'s decision, granted by the High Court as a precaution, was rescinded as unnecessary. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the High Court appeal, excluding costs related to the appeal from Crisp J.