Google Inc v Trkulja

In the case of Google Inc v Trkulja, the plaintiff, Mr Trkulja, alleged that Google Inc, as the provider of an internet search engine, published search results that were defamatory of him. The dispute was brought before the Supreme Court of Victoria. The plaintiff argued that the search engine's results, including images, text, and autocomplete predictions, contained defamatory content that harmed his reputation. Google Inc challenged the plaintiff's claims, asserting that it was not liable for the content published by third parties and that the search results did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The court was tasked with determining whether Google Inc published the allegedly defamatory search results and if the plaintiff had relied on the matter as a basis for his defamation claim. The court also needed to decide if the matter relied on by the plaintiff was capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, particularly given that the publication was considered a composite publication. The court considered previous cases such as Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corporation, Trkulja v Google Inc (No 5), Bleyer v Google Inc, Yeung v Google Inc, Duffy v Google Inc, Crookes v Newton, and Niemela v Malamas in its deliberations.

The Supreme Court of Victoria found that the plaintiff's proceeding had no real prospect of success and set aside the writ, amended statement of claim, and the service of the writ outside the jurisdiction. The court relied on Agar v Hyde, the Civil Procedure Act 2010, and the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 in reaching its decision. The appeal was allowed, and leave to appeal was granted. This ruling emphasised the importance of the real prospect of success criterion in defamation cases and highlighted the court's willingness to intervene in proceedings that were unlikely to succeed.