Gesler v Hibble

In the matter of Gesler v Hibble, the defendant was appealing against a decision of the Magistrates Court of Tasmania, which had ordered her to pay costs pursuant to the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1976 (Tas). The defendant had been charged with assaulting a police officer, but was found not guilty at trial. Following her acquittal, the court ordered her to pay costs under section 11 of the Act. The defendant challenged this decision, arguing that she was not liable to pay costs because she had been found not guilty. The central issue for the court was whether the defendant’s acquittal entitled her to be exempt from the payment of costs under the Act.

The court considered whether the defendant’s acquittal was a sufficient basis for the exemption from costs. The court noted that the defendant’s acquittal did not automatically mean that she was exempt from paying costs. Instead, the court had to consider whether the defendant had acted unreasonably in instituting or continuing the proceedings. The court held that the defendant’s conduct in continuing with the prosecution despite the lack of evidence was unreasonable and, therefore, she was not entitled to be exempt from the payment of costs. The court found that the defendant’s conduct demonstrated a disregard for the court’s process and an intention to waste the court’s time, which justified the imposition of costs.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the defendant’s appeal and upheld the order for her to pay costs. The court emphasised that the discretion to award costs was not absolute and had to be exercised with care. The court noted that the decision to award costs was a matter of discretion and that the defendant’s acquittal did not necessarily mean that she was exempt from the payment of costs. The court held that the defendant’s conduct in continuing with the prosecution despite the lack of evidence was unreasonable and, therefore, she was not entitled to be exempt from the payment of costs. The court’s decision highlighted the importance of the discretion to award costs and the need for courts to exercise that discretion carefully.