George Hudson Ltd v Australian Timber Workers' Union

George Hudson Ltd. appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had been asked to consider a case stated by a Stipendiary Magistrate. The dispute concerned a breach of an industrial agreement made in November 1920 between the Australian Timber Workers' Union and George Hudson & Son Ltd. The appellant, George Hudson Ltd., had taken over the business of George Hudson & Son Ltd. after the agreement was made and the memorandum filed. The Union charged George Hudson Ltd. with failing to post a copy of the agreement as required by its terms.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1921, which amended section 24 of the principal Act to bind successors and assignees of businesses, applied retrospectively to agreements made and successions occurring before its enactment. Additionally, the Court had to determine if this retrospective application of the amended section 24 was within the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, specifically under section 51 (XXXV.) and (XXXIX.) of the Constitution. The Court also considered whether a point of law not raised in the lower court could be considered on a case stated to the Supreme Court, and whether the matter was properly before the High Court under section 40A of the Judiciary Act.

A majority of the High Court (Isaacs, Higgins, and Starke JJ.) held that section 24(1) as amended by the 1921 Act applied to agreements made and successors who became such prior to the amending Act's commencement. They further held that, as interpreted, this provision was within the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. The majority also affirmed that the Supreme Court, on a case stated under section 101 of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW), could entertain a legal objection not raised in the Court of Petty Sessions if it could not be cured by evidence. The Court also found that an appeal to the Supreme Court from an inferior court constituted a "cause pending" in the Supreme Court for the purposes of section 40A of the Judiciary Act.

However, Knox C.J. and Gavan Duffy J. dissented on the constitutional question, finding that the amended section 24(1) was beyond the powers conferred by section 51 (XXXV.) and (XXXIX.) of the Constitution, drawing a distinction with the decision in *Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow & Co.*. Despite the dissent on the constitutional validity, the appeal was dismissed, and the costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court were ordered to be paid by the appellant company.