Garrod & Davenort
Case
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[2018] FamCA 825
•12 October 2018
Details
AGLC
Case
Decision Date
Garrod & Davenort [2018] FamCA 825
[2018] FamCA 825
12 October 2018
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case concerned parenting orders for a child, B, born in 2010, involving the child's mother and father. The dispute arose in the context of the second set of final parenting orders in six years, with the court considering the necessity of protecting the child from psychological harm to take precedence over the benefit of a meaningful relationship with the father. The father's history included physical, psychological, and coercive controlling violence towards the mother both before and after their separation, as well as violence towards a subsequent partner. The child had been exposed to the father's violence towards both the mother and his later partner. The court also considered the father's conduct during the parenting proceedings to be a form of family violence. While an allegation of the father's physical harm to the child was not accepted, the court found an unacceptable risk of psychological abuse by the father towards both the mother and the child.
The central legal issues before the court were whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, and if so, what parenting arrangements were in the child's best interests, particularly in light of the father's history of family violence. The court also had to consider the adequacy of previous expert evidence, which had failed to identify or appropriately address the father's violent behaviour over a six-year period. The court was required to determine whether supervised time would provide sufficient protection for the child and how to address the father's ongoing therapeutic needs.
Bennett J reasoned that the father's pattern of coercive controlling violence, extending to his subsequent relationship and the child's exposure to this violence, created an unacceptable risk of psychological harm to the child. The court found that supervised time was insufficient to afford the child adequate protection. Consequently, the father's time with the child was suspended during the trial and he was restrained by the final order from bringing further parenting proceedings for spend time or residence for a further two years, during which time he was required to undertake therapy for perpetrators of family violence. The court determined it was inappropriate to introduce a spend time regime via a self-executing order and that any future spend time arrangements would only be considered upon a favourable assessment of the father's therapeutic progress.
The court ordered the discharge of all previous parenting orders and granted the mother sole parental responsibility for the child's long-term care, welfare, and development, with the child to live with the mother. The father was restrained from making further parenting applications for two years without leave and was subject to an injunction preventing him from attending near the mother's or child's residence, the mother's workplace, or the child's school or recreational locations. Communication between the father and child was limited to sending a card and/or present twice a year, subject to the mother's discretion and examination. The court also made detailed provisions regarding costs applications and the inclusion of a fact sheet outlining the orders and their consequences.
The central legal issues before the court were whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, and if so, what parenting arrangements were in the child's best interests, particularly in light of the father's history of family violence. The court also had to consider the adequacy of previous expert evidence, which had failed to identify or appropriately address the father's violent behaviour over a six-year period. The court was required to determine whether supervised time would provide sufficient protection for the child and how to address the father's ongoing therapeutic needs.
Bennett J reasoned that the father's pattern of coercive controlling violence, extending to his subsequent relationship and the child's exposure to this violence, created an unacceptable risk of psychological harm to the child. The court found that supervised time was insufficient to afford the child adequate protection. Consequently, the father's time with the child was suspended during the trial and he was restrained by the final order from bringing further parenting proceedings for spend time or residence for a further two years, during which time he was required to undertake therapy for perpetrators of family violence. The court determined it was inappropriate to introduce a spend time regime via a self-executing order and that any future spend time arrangements would only be considered upon a favourable assessment of the father's therapeutic progress.
The court ordered the discharge of all previous parenting orders and granted the mother sole parental responsibility for the child's long-term care, welfare, and development, with the child to live with the mother. The father was restrained from making further parenting applications for two years without leave and was subject to an injunction preventing him from attending near the mother's or child's residence, the mother's workplace, or the child's school or recreational locations. Communication between the father and child was limited to sending a card and/or present twice a year, subject to the mother's discretion and examination. The court also made detailed provisions regarding costs applications and the inclusion of a fact sheet outlining the orders and their consequences.
Details
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Injunction
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Costs
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Procedural Fairness
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Remedies
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Standing
Actions
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Citations
Garrod & Davenort [2018] FamCA 825
Most Recent Citation
Dodd & Ferrell [2022] FedCFamC2F 1763
Cases Citing This Decision
4
Bretz & Jankowska
[2024] FedCFamC1F 579
Clery & Clery
[2022] FedCFamC1F 99
Dodd & Ferrell
[2022] FedCFamC2F 1763
Cases Cited
6
Statutory Material Cited
9
M v M
[1988] HCA 68
Briginshaw v Briginshaw
[1938] HCA 34
Briginshaw v Briginshaw
[1938] HCA 36