[2001] QCA 53
COURT OF APPEAL
de JERSEY CJ
WILLIAMS JA
AMBROSE J
Appeal No 11084 of 2000
BRONWYN NARELLE FURSEY Applicant
and
SOLICITORS’ BOARD Respondent
BRISBANE
..DATE 21/02/2001
JUDGMENT
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: On 13 September 1999, Ms Fursey was admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme Court. Her practical training for the purposes of the Solicitors’ Admission Rules comprised serving as an Associate from September 1991 until February 1996 to Justice Jordan of the Family Court of Australia.
With the approval of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Solicitors’ Board regards such service as sufficient, although it is not covered expressly by the Solicitors’ Admission Rules. The difficulty is that save for the final one year and seven months of that overall period, Justice Jordan was not a Judge but a Judicial Registrar.
Significantly however, Ms Fursey’s duties remained similar throughout the entire period. She presented herself to the Court on the basis that throughout the period she was Associate to a Family Court Judge. She thereby misled the Court, but not deliberately or consciously, and she was indeed supported in her approach by material from the Judge, again inadvertently overlooking the change in the Judge’s position. Ms Fursey has now drawn this matter to the attention of the Court, and properly so.
The Solicitors’ Board does not oppose any validation of her admission should that be thought necessary. The Solicitors’ Board has sought the Court’s advice under Rule 96 in relation to the interaction of Rules 21, 36 and 94. Rule 36 relates to service as a Judge’s Associate in the High Court, the Supreme Court, the District Court or the Federal Court. Rule 94 concerns abridging or extending time in relation to that service; that is, the reference in Rule 94 to a Judge’s Associate imports the definition of that term set out in Rule 2.
Rule 21, on the other hand, deals specifically with service as an Associate to a Judge of another Court, for example, the Family Court of Australia. In that case, Rule 21 gives the Board power to abridge a period of practical training, in this instance recognising the sufficiency of the serving as Associate to the Family Court Registrar then Judge, the Board could have abridged to nil the time to be served under articles in terms of Rule 21.
The Board says that it would have referred the issue to the Court had it adverted to the issue. In that event, it may be taken that the Court would have exercised the relevant discretion favourably to Ms Fursey. There is no need for any declaration as to the validity of her admission, which may be taken to be in order now as is stands.
WILLIAMS JA: I agree.
AMBROSE J: I agree.
- AGLC
- Fursey v Solicitors' Board [2001] QCA 53
- Case
- [2001] QCA 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation of the Solicitors’ Admission Rules, specifically Rules 21, 36, and 94, to determine whether Fursey’s practical training as an Associate to a Judicial Registrar, who later became a Judge, was sufficient to meet the requirements for admission. The court was also required to address the procedural issue of whether the Solicitors’ Board had the authority to validate Fursey’s admission and whether the Board’s failure to object to the validity of her admission constituted an implied consent to the same.
The court found that the Solicitors’ Board had the authority to validate Fursey’s admission and that her practical training, although not explicitly covered by the rules, was deemed sufficient due to the similarity in duties performed during the entire period of service. The court held that there was no need for a declaration regarding the validity of Fursey’s admission as it was already considered in order. The Board’s failure to object to her admission implied consent, and thus no further action was necessary. The judges unanimously agreed on the outcome.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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